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Introduction
Forest certification is a process through which transnational
networks of diverse actors set and enforce standards for the
sustainable management of forests around the world. The central
purpose of forest certification programs is to verify for interested
outsiders that the management activities of certified enterprises are
acceptable and appropriate. In doing so, certification programs take on
important public roles. First, they define what kind of behavior is
acceptable and appropriate. Some programs incorporate considerable
public input and participation, others very little. Some stress multi-
stakeholder decision-making while others rely almost entirely on
industry associations or firms. No major certification program,
however, relies primarily on the policy formation processes of govern-
ment.' Second, certification programs establish mechanisms to
enforce their policies, and to provide public assurances that they are
being met. Again, they place little or no reliance on existing
governmental enforcement programs. Rather, they devise their own
organizational monitoring, auditing, and adjudication2 systems, and
seek to establish credibility independent of government agencies.3
I I use the term "government" to refer to the organizational structures of
nation states, including their subunits and intergovernmental organizations. My use
of the term reflects a desire to keep to a minimum the theoretical implications often
associated with "the state" in Western, and particularly European thought, and also
to allow for the great variability and frequent lack of coordination among agencies
and institutions operating under the rubric of government.
2 Adjudication is used here in the commonplace American sense, to refer
to decisions about whether particular cases meet general criteria, regardless of
whether the decision maker is ajudge, an administrative official, or an actor outside
the government.
3 There are some partial exceptions to this statement- primarily the emergent
Pan European Forest Certification Council program. Peter Sprang, Aspects of
Quality Assurance Under the Certification SchemesFSC andPEFC, Diplomarbeit,
University of Freiburg Institute for Forestry Economics Website, available at
http://www.ruf.uni-freiburg.de/forstoko/veroff/arbeitspapier.html (2001); and the
longer standing Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (LEI). Christopher Elliott, Forest
Certification: A Policy Perspective, Center for International Forestry Research in
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Products from certified forestry enterprises are generally entitled to
display a logo signifying their propriety.
The environmental policy-making and enforcement functions
undertaken by certification programs have been performed primarily
by governments for at least the past century, and longer in some
societies. Hence the initial theoretical challenge is how to conceptu-
alize certification programs. Given that they are not governmental
initiatives, much of the existing literature describes certification
programs as 'market mechanisms' or 'market driven.' But these
descriptions are true only in the loosest sense, in that certification
programs seek to achieve their goals by restructuring producers'
relationships to consumers through markets. At base, the groups that
have pioneered certification programs, primarily the Forest Steward-
ship Council4 and affiliated advocacy organizations such as the
World-Wide Fund for Nature, Rainforest Alliance, and Friends of the
Earth,5 have not been responding to market forces. Rather, they have
sought to harness market forces to the pursuit of environmental
protection and other social and ethical goals. Their objective has been
to institute predictable, long term ordering of the behavior of forestry
Jakarta, Indonesia (2000). (Originally published as a Ph.D. Thesis, Forest
Certification: Analysis from a Policy Network Perspective. ltcole Polytechnique
F~drale De Lausanne, 1999). Both of these programs, however, have been driven
by the civil society movement, and can be understood as catch-up efforts by
governmental agencies to recapture a leading role in the field.
4 The Forest Stewardship Council is an international organization founded
in 1993 to promote the sustainable management of forests around the world.
Although it has received support from foundations, environmental Non-
governmental organizations, particularly the World Wildlife Fund, and some
mostly European governments, it is a free standing organization. It devotes its
resources primarily to the setting of forest management standards and to ,the
accreditation of certification organizations whose role it is to determine whether
particular management organizations meet the standards. For more thorough
descriptions, see the FSC website available at http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm
or Errol Meidinger, 'Private' Environmental Regulation, Human Rights, and
Community, 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 130-82 (1999).
5 Elliott, supra note 3.
THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
firms-i.e., "social regulation of the market".6 Hence, while market
forces are undoubtedly crucial to the success of certification programs,
market constructs provide only a partial understanding of the social
dynamics of forest certification.
One of the primary theoretical constructs used to conceptualize
organized efforts to shape social behavior beyond the domains of
government and market-and one occasionally invoked by promoters
of forest certification-is that of 'civil society.' 7 The goal of this paper
is to elucidate both forest certification and the concept of civil society
by locating forest certification in the context of civil society theory.
Moreover, since certification programs seek to achieve the long term
regulation of forest management in a predictable, law-like manner, the
paper explores the question of the degree to which certification
programs can be seen as modifying or actually creating law. Finally,
it examines forest certification in terms of some of the critical
analytical perspectives characteristic of legal scholarship.
The Basics of Forest Certification
What does it mean to 'certify' a forest? Obviously, it does not
mean certifying the forest per se, since that would be unintelligible.
Rather, it means certifying that the people responsible for a forest are
taking care of it properly. Thus, from a commonsensical perspective
forest certification implies that: (1) we understand what it means to
take care of a forest properly and that (2) a trustworthy person who
understands proper forest management (3) visits the forest and
assesses the work of the people who manage it and (4) certifies to
6 Virginia Haufler, New Forms of Governance: Certification Regimes as
Social Regulation of the Market, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF FOREST
CERTIFICATION, 237-247 (Errol E. Meidinger, et al. eds., 2003).
7 The term is used broadly here to include a variety of formulations which
seem to be based on the same basic set of ideas, such as the "third system"
discussion represented by Marc Nerfin, Neither Prince nor Merchant-An
Introduction to the Third System, IFDA Dossier, No. 56:3-29. (1986); and David
Korten in GETTING TO THE 21ST CENTURY: VOLUNTARY ACTION AND THE
GLOBAL AGENDA (1990).
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others that things are being done correctly. Conversely, if the forest is
not being managed properly, certification is withheld.
The idea of forest certification gained currency in a series of
discussions among North American and European environmental
activists and socially conscious tropical hardwood users in the1980s
and early 1990s. It was particularly attractive to environmentalists
because they saw it as a way of responding to the widely perceived
problem of tropical deforestation and yet not supporting a boycott of
all tropical timber, as had been proposed by some environmental
groups in developed countries. The great advantage of certification
was that it could provide a means to identify tropical timber that was
properly grown and harvested, thus allowing northern consumers to
buy tropical hardwoods without feeling that they were contributing to
tropical deforestation. It soon became apparent, however, that to be
perceived as fair, such a program would have to apply to tropical and
non-tropical timber alike, since there was widespread and justifiable
skepticism about the sustainability of much management in temperate
and boreal forests.
Starting with the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 1993,
forest certification programs proliferated rapidly. Today there are
anywhere between six and twenty or more, depending on how one
counts.8 At a more general level, however, they are converging around
8 The most recent report of the Confederation of European Paper Industries
lists 20 programs: (1) FSC International, (2) PEFC International, (3) American
Forest & Paper Association Sustainable Forestry Initiative, (4) American Tree
Farm System, (5) Czech Council of the National Certification Center, (6) Finnish
Forest Certification Council, (7) Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (LEI), (8) Living
Forests Norway (PEFC affiliated), (9) PEFC Austria, (10) PEFC Council of Latvia,
(i) PEFC France, (12) PEFC Germany, (13) PEFC Sweden, (14) PEFC
Switzerland and HWK Zertifizierungsstelle, (15) PEFC UK, (16) Standards
Council of Canada, (17) Associacao Brasileira de Normas Technicas, (18)
CEF--Certificaci6n Espaflola Forestal, (19) Conselho Da Fileira Florestal
Portuguesa, and (20) Malaysian Timber Certification Council. Many of these are
affiliated with and were developed by the PEFC, and therefore this may be seen as
an overcount; on the other hand, as the FSC's national and regional standard setting
efforts progress and potentially develop increased autonomy, it could also come to
be seen as an undercount. In any event, the list does give a sense of the fluidity of
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two alliances, one centered on the NGO-oriented9 FSC and the other
centered on the forest production-oriented Pan European Forest
Certification Council (PEFC).
As certification programs have proliferated, they have formed
around a common set of institutional functions: standard setting,
certification, accreditation of certifiers, product labeling, and
administration.° The remainder of this section briefly describes these
functions and how they are being carried out by existing certification
programs. Because the FSC has been the driving force and the model
in terms of which competing certification programs define themselves,
the FSC's practices are used to exemplify certification institutions.
Standard Setting
All certification programs set standards for forest management
on the basis of which forest management operations (FMOs) are to be
program boundaries in the field. Confederation of European Paper Industries,
Comparative Matrix of Forest Certification Schemes,(2001) available at
http://www.cepi.org/htdocs/pdfs/newsletters/pub-a29.pdf
9 'NGO' stands for 'non-governmental organization' and is used in this
paper primarily to reference environmental protection and social justice advocacy
organizations.
10 Forest certification programs were able to draw upon a long legacy of
certification programs in other sectors. In the U.S., for example, Underwriters
Laboratories (UL) had been setting safety standards for electrical appliances and
monitoring manufacturer compliance for almost a century when forest certification
began. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) had been setting fire
safety standards for buildings (although not certifying them) for nearly as long. The
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) had
been setting standards for and certifying health care organizations for over four
decades. There are certainly hundreds and probably thousands of such programs
around the world. See e.g.,Ross E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS:
REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS (1990). These programs have
gradually converged on a number of forms of standardization. Much of this
standardization has been brought under the umbrella of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), which is a global federation of approx-
imately 140 national standard setting bodies that has developed international
standards for countless types of industries and practices.
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certified. They all orient themselves in terms of the goal of
'sustainable forest management' (SFM), although the FSC is
unwilling to claim that it can certify that forest management will in
fact turn out to be sustainable. SFM has been the subject of continuing
debate in the larger field of forest policy and has undergone
considerable change in recent decades. The basic tendency of that
change has been to broaden the set of considerations that forest
managers must take into account, from (1) ensuring a steady flow of
timber from the forest, to (2) protecting the range of ecological
functions, components, and services provided by the forest, to
(3) protecting the many societal interests tied to the forest.
Forest certification programs have relied on two different types
of standards in pursuing SFM: (1) performance outcomes or
(2) management systems. Performance standards require the achieve-
ment of concrete conditions in the forest or in human organizations
related to the forest. For example, the FSC's principles and criteria
require that FMOs:
(1) comply with applicable laws and treaties;
(2) ensure that long term tenure and use rights are clearly
established;
(3) recognize and respect indigenous peoples' legal and
customary rights,
(4) maintain or enhance the social and economic well-
being of forest workers and local communities;
(5) use forest resources efficiently to ensure economic
viability;
(6) conserve biodiversity and protect ecological functions;
(7) implement a long term management plan;
(8) monitor management performance and environmental
and social impacts;
(9) protect high conservation value forests (e.g., those that
contain endangered biota or fulfill crucial ecological or
social functions);
(10) and manage plantation forests so as to reduce pressure
THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
on natural forests."
These goals are further defined by more specific criteria.
Among the criteria for conserving biodiversity, for example, are the
following:
6.2 Safeguards shall exist which protect rare, threatened and
endangered species and their habitats (e.g., nesting and
feeding areas). Conservation zones and protection areas shall
be established, appropriate to the scale and intensity of forest
management and the uniqueness of the affected resources.
Inappropriate hunting, fishing, trapping and collecting shall be
controlled.
6.3 Ecological functions and values shall be maintained
intact, enhanced, or restored, including:
a) Forest regeneration and succession.
b) Genetic, species, and ecosystem diversity.
c) Natural cycles that affect the productivity of the
forest ecosystem.
6.4 Representative samples of existing ecosystems within the
landscape shall be protected in their natural state and recorded
on maps, appropriate to the scale and intensity of operations
and the uniqueness of the affected resources.
6.5 Written guidelines shall be prepared and implemented to:
control erosion; minimize forest damage during harvesting,
road construction, and all other mechanical disturbances; and
protect water resources....
There are approximately 50 such criteria for the various
See the FSC Website, available at http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm
for a full quotation of the FSC Principles. There were originally nine principles,
and the ninth and tenth have been debated and revised in recent years.
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principles, and they are further elaborated by locally specific
standards.
A management system standard, on the other hand, focuses on
defining management processes and responsibilities within the FMO.
The most influential such standard is the ISO 14001 environmental
management standard (EMS) recently developed by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). The basic idea is to require
the FMO to define and implement a specific set of responsibilities and
processes for dealing with environmental and related issues. EMSs
typically include arrangements for ascertaining the organization's
environmental effects, planning how to increase the positive ones
and/or decrease the negative ones, and achieving 'continuous
improvement.' The underlying argument for EMSs is that harnessing
the planning and control capacities of the FMO to the goal of
improving environmental performance may achieve better results in
a dynamic and uncertain environment than would a reliance on fixed
performance standards. 2 Several industry based certification
programs, such as that of the Canadian Standards Association' 3 and
the Sustainable Forestry Initiative 4 have relied heavily on manage-
ment system standards, although they are also adding performance
oriented standards.
As the distinction between performance and management
system standards suggests, there are also different levels of generality
at which standards can be set: (1) for the program as a whole, (2) for
local areas covered by of the program, or (3) for specific FMOs. In
practice, organizations at each of these levels usually also play a role
in standard setting, in part because it is impossible to set standards in
12 See e.g.,Cary Coglianese, & Jennifer Nash, REGULATING FROM THE
INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS?
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future (2001).
13 Canadian Standards Association Standard CAN/CSA Z808/Z809-200 1.
Available at http://www.csa.ca.
14 American Forest & Paper Association Sustainable Forestry Initiative. See
website available at http://www.afandpa.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
EnvironmentandRecycling/SFI/SFl.htm
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sufficient breadth and detail to dispose of every possible situation.
Given the variability of local situations around the world and rapid
changes in knowledge, it often makes sense to leave some important
details to local decision makers.
All existing certification programs employ each of the standard
setting options described above (i.e., central/local/FMO and
performance/management system) to at least some degree, but in quite
different mixes. Programs also vary by which kinds of actors
participate at each level. While they all provide for some degree of
stakeholder input, the amount varies greatly, from the formal tripartite
environmental/social/economic structure of the FSC to the industry-
dominated structures of the Sustainable Forestry Initiative and the Pan
European Forest Certification Council.15 Finally, the standards of
forest certification programs vary considerably in scope. While most
standards focus on forestry practices and biological conditions, some
also include social justice concerns such as the protection of laborers,
indigenous peoples and local communities.
Certification
Certification of FMOs is the core function of forest certification
programs. To carry it out the programs must define organizational
processes and relationships likely to assure compliance with applicable
forest management standards. To be useful, these arrangements must
also persuade outside observers that they are likely to result in a high
degree of compliance-i.e., they must be credible. While all forest
certification programs rely to some extent on the internal processes of
FMOs, they also rely on outside monitoring. The most rigorous
approach is 'third party verification,' wherein a person or organization
that is neither part of the FMO, nor one of its customers or suppliers, is
given authority to assess compliance with the program standards. Not
all certification programs require third party verification, however. Even
15 The Pan European Forest Certification Program available at
http://www.pefc.org
2002-2003]
222 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.10
where it is used variations in how it is implemented may lead to
differences in reliability. Perhaps the most important variable is the
degree of control that the forestry enterprise can exercise over the
certification body and its findings. Some programs give FMOs much
more control over the selection, terms of employment, and findings of
certifiers than do others. Overall, there has been a steady tendency
among forest certification programs to institute third party verification,
but there are still enormous differences among them. Even the most
rigorous programs still face questions of credibility deriving from the
fact that certifiers are paid by the FMOs seeking certification.
At present, the FSC operates the most demanding certification
program, which has the following characteristics. Certification is done
by a small number of organizationally independent certification
organizations. The certifiers use multi-disciplinary teams to review the
on-the-ground management operations of each forestry operation that
applies for certification. A typical FSC certification would involve
roughly the following steps:
(1) preliminary discussions between the potential
applicant and one or more certifiers, including indica-
tions of what changes the applicant likely will have to
make to achieve certification;
(2) submission of an application to a certifier, including
documentation of the applicant's operation;
(3) negotiation of a budget and other contractual terms of
the assessment, possibly including a 'scoping' process;
(4) on-the-ground field assessment, including required
consultations with local stakeholders; 6
(5) preparation of a draft assessment report by the certifier;
(6) peer review of the report by two or three independent
specialists;
(7) discussion of possible terms and conditions of
16 Most stakeholder consultation processes to date have been developed by
certification organizations. The FSC is now working to systematize information on
and approaches to local consultation.
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certification with the applicant;
(8) a final certification decision (see below);
(9) certificate issuance, processing of final payments,
further certification contracts, press releases, etc; and
(10) random annual follow-up audits.
Certifiers have several options in reaching a final decision on
certification: (1) approve an application unconditionally; (2) grant
provisional approval on condition that certain corrective actions are
taken within a certain time; (3) indicate that approval will be granted
after certain preconditions are met; or (4) deny the application.
Certificates ordinarily last for five years, after which time a thorough-
going reassessment occurs prior to renewal.
Accreditation
When programs embrace third party certification, an important
question immediately arises as to who should be qualified-i.e., be
'accredited'-to serve as a certifier. Some certification programs,
notably the FSC, make their own accreditation determinations, while
others use accreditation organizations that developed for other
purposes (sometimes under the ISO umbrella), and some allow FMOs
to make their own determinations as to who qualifies as a certifier.
Labeling
The last key element of a forest certification program is how
it ties wood products sold in consumer markets to certified forestry
operations. All major certification programs have now developed
programs for attaching their labels to wood products. The FSC logo,
for example, is a somewhat deciduous looking conifer joined to the
long end of a check mark:
2002-2003]
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FSC
The American Forest and Paper Association recently changed its logo
for the Sustainable Forestry Initiative from one containing both kinds
of trees with a bear and fish circling them, presumably invoking an
ecosystem image, to one of a conifer inside what appears to be a




The PEFC has taken elements of them all and given the logo a sense
of cycling:
PEFC'
Their rules for determining which wood products qualify, and
particularly how those wood products must be traced through the
chain of production ('chain of custody requirements'-COC), are
quite variable and remain under development, but are widely seen as
a key element of effective certification.
The above paragraphs describe the key institutional elements
of forest certification programs, they say little about how the programs
can have come into being outside traditional governmental agencies
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or what their role is in the governance of society. The next two
sections begin to fill in the picture with discussions of civil society
and its increasingly global character.
Civil Society
In the mid- 1980's I had a memorable conversation with two
colleagues in my university's Native American Studies Program,
Professors John Mohawk and Oren Lyons. We were discussing a
possible joint course in American Indian Law. As we talked about
Native.land claims in the US, our conversation turned to the efforts of
the Brazilian government at the time to remove indigenous peoples
from their land in the Amazon rain forest. When I expressed pessim-
ism about the natives' prospects, Oren surprised me with his confident
reply. He said something like, "The Brazilian government should
know they can't keep doing that. The whole world is watching, and
the whole world knows this is wrong. We'll see it on TV tomorrow,
and we can make a lot of trouble for them." When I asked how such
trouble would be made, he and John offered a variety of examples,
including picketing Brazilian embassies, protesting at the UN (where
Oren would soon be giving a speech), pressuring the World Bank, and
possibly provoking consumer boycotts. 7
When I countered that the major media might not even
publicize the land battles in Brazil, John replied with his usual droll
humor: "Well, we have computers, too. Usually we just set our coffee
on them, but we do know how to turn them on." The "we" they were
referring to was a network of indigenous peoples and their allies
around the world. Oren looked into the northern distance out my
office window and noted that the Sami people of Scandinavia would
17 I cannot remember whether they listed the possibility of dealing directly
with the corporations doing business in Brazil, although I do not think they did.
Today they probably would mention this option in the same sentence.
2002-2003]
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be just as willing to join the battle as the Haudenosaunee, 18 since all
indigenous peoples have essentially similar claims to justice among
the peoples of the world.
My colleagues might resist being described as part of a civil
society movement, since, like most indigenous groups in North
America, the Haudenosaunee prefer to define themselves as
sovereign.19 Yet, the expectations, processes, and structures they were
describing are very consistent with what is coming to be called global
civil society. Before describing the global variant, however, it is
useful to provide a brief overview of the traditional, more locally
oriented concept of civil society.
Domestic
Like "sovereignty," the term "civil society" is an evolving and
often contested construct whose meaning has varied in different times
and places.20 In modem academic discussions it generally refers to a
sphere of social life that is public, but outside the sphere of
government. Most references also exclude the realm of intimate asso-
ciations, although American commentators sometimes include the
family in discussions of civil society." In addition, with the exception
Is "Haudenosaunee" is the proper name for the people whom the Europeans
labeled the "Iroquois." The latter term, which translates as "real adders," came
from the Algonquins, who are traditional enemies of the Haudenosaunee. John C.
Mohawk, Iroquois Confederacy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS
298 (1996).
19 The Haudenosaunee are organized as a federation of six nations (the
Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Seneca, and Tuscarora). The Tuscarora
migrated from North Carolina and joined it in the early 18th century. The
Confederation issues a single passport, which has been accepted by many nations
around the world. Personal communications with Oren Lyons & John Mohawk.
20 E.g., J. EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OFAN IDEA
(1999).
21 American commentators discussing domestic policy tend to include the
family in civil society institutions because of its importance in producing and
reproducing patterns of societal relationships. See generally, Linda C. McClain &
James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
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of neo-liberals, most commentators treat civil society as distinct from
typical market relationships, which focus on matching prices and
quantities to facilitate the exchange of goods and services.22 Diamond
offers a relatively conventional definition:
[Civil Society] is distinct from "society" in general in that it
involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express
their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information,
achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state
officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary entity,
standing between the private sphere and the state. Thus, it
excludes individual and family life, inward-lobking group
activity (e.g. recreation, entertainment, or spirituality), the for-
profit-making enterprise of individual business firms, and politi-
cal efforts to take control of the state.23
Most theorists also portray civil society relationships as
voluntary or un-coerced. 24 Although the true degree of voluntariness
of some civil society relationships is subject to question, they
generally lack the sanctions associated with government directives.
Nonetheless, civil society organizations have long been viewed as
playing a powerful role in steering the course of society. Gramsci, for
example, depicted civil society organizations (epitomized by the
Catholic Church) as achieving a high level of social influence by
exercising cultural leadership ("hegemony") despite their general lack
of state power.25
REV. 301, 301-335 (2000).
22 E.g., JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW A. ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND
POLITICAL THEORY (1992).
23 Larry Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation, in THE GLOBAL
RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 227, 228 (Larry Diamond & Marc Platter, eds., 2d
ed. 1996).
24 E.g., Michael Walzer, The Concept of Civil Society, in TOWARD A
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 7,8 (Michael Walzer, ed., 1995).
25 ANTONIO GRAMSCI, THE MODERN PRINCE AND OTHER WRITINGS
(International Publishers 1971) (1891); Kai Nielsen, Reconceptualizing Civil
Societyfor Now: Some Somewhat Gramscian Turnings, in TOWARD A GLOBAL
CIVIL SOCIETY 41 (Michael Walzer, ed., 1995).
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There are many types of civil society organizations. Walzer's
examples (drawn from recent Eastern European experience) include
"unions, churches, political parties and movements, cooperatives,
neighborhoods, schools of thought, societies for promoting or
preventing this and that".26 Mertus adds "non-governmental advocacy
organizations, humanitarian service organizations,. . . information
and news media, educational associations, and certain forms of
economic organization," leaving the specific nature of the last to be
filled in.27 Conceptualizing the relationship of economic organizations
to civil society is difficult, and may grow more so in the forest
certification context, where trade associations and large corporations
are becoming increasingly active.28 As Virginia Haufler suggests in a
related context, it would not make sense to ignore business
associations that are seeking to define the conditions of socially
responsible commerce, even if they are driven by the quest for profit.29
Accordingly, my working approach is treat those aspects of business
organization which are oriented to defining and institutionalizing
public accountability outside government agencies as civil society
actors. 0
While the overall sphere of civil society is portrayed as either
value neutral3 or limited to very general values such as freedom and
tolerance,2 specific civil society organizations are typically involved
26 Walzer, supra note 24, at 8.
27 Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human
Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INTL'L L. REV.
1335, 1338 (1999).
29 Queena Sook Kim & Jim Carlton, Battle Breaks Out Over Rival Seals for
'Green' Wood, WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 22, 2001, at B 1.
29 Virginia Haufler, Self-Regulation and Business Norms: Political Risk
Political Activism, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Clair
Cutler et al. eds., 1999).
30 The major risk, not addressed in this paper, is that business will so
dominate civil society as to effectively destroy it. Ehrenberg, supra note 21.
31 E.g., Amatai Etzioni, GeneralLaw in Civil Society, GoodSociety, and The
Prescriptive State, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 355, 355-377 (2000).
32 E.g., JOHN KEANE, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1988).
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in "promoting or preventing this or that".33 They can be characterized
by a commitment to particular substantive values, or visions of good
society, and their purpose is to promote those visions. Thus they
regularly engage in moral evaluation, often using the "mobilization of
shame" to achieve their goals. 34 Moreover, since civil society organi-
zations promote moral evaluation, it is not surprising that they are also
subject to it. Thus, their methods and strategies are inevitably
vulnerable to critique, and they are frequently under pressure to
improve them. Today the primary pressures are to be more trans-
parent, democratic, and accountable35 and to eliminate exclusionary
membership practices. 36 Although these pressures may follow
logically from the premise that civil society organizations are
voluntary in nature, they are equally present for governments and to
a lesser extent for firms.
Of course, civil society is a normative concept as well as an
empirical one. Much of its appeal to modem thinkers rests in its role
as a bulwark for human dignity and self-determination against both
the state and the market. Although this function was already important
for De Tocqueville (1875), it was critical in the rebirth and elaboration
of the civil society movement in Eastern Europe during the late 1970s
and 1980s. There, activist intellectuals developed the idea of civil
society into a vision in which groups could self-organize in semi-
autonomous spaces outside the purview of the state. Their goal was
not to "seize power" from the state, but rather to humanize the
relationship between state and society by establishing new or renewed
patterns of interaction in civil society. 37 Their efforts became part of
a larger European movement, which drew together Western European
peace and Eastern European human rights organizations, and which
33 Walzer, supra note 24.
34 Mertus, supra note 27.
35 Id
36 Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.
J. 417 (1997).
3" Adam Michnik, A New Evolutionism, in LETTERS FROM PRISON AND
OTHER ESSAYS, 135 (Maya Latynski, trans., 1985).
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Mary Kaldor 38 portrays as the birthplace of the modem civil society
movement, although this portrayal may be overly Eurocentric.39
The importance and successes of the Eastern European civil
society movement helped bring the concept back to the fore in
academic discussions around the world. Among other things, it led
many theorists to shift from a focus on "government(s)" to
"governance"," although other academic currents too numerous to
note also contributed to this tendency." Research on civil society
tends to focus on (1) the types of actors involved, (2) the substantive
values they pursue, (3) the processes and methods they use, and (4)
their relationships to other sectors of society. Each of these topics is
discussed in the next section. While government, civil society, and the
market can be distinguished analytically, however, they are
operationally intertwined. The three spheres are also mutually
interdependent; shifts in one are likely to affect the others, and often
are intended to do so. Therefore researchers focusing on one sphere
are wise to trace its relationships to others.
Global
In the course of the 1980s, various civil society and peace
movements from different regions gradually drew together into a
transnational network of relationships and actions. In fact, although
not everyone recognized it at the time, regional and issue specific civil
38 Mary H. Kaldor, The Ideas of 1989: The Origins of the Concept of Global
Civil Society, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 475, 475-88 (1999).
39 As my discussion with Professors Mohawk and Lyons indicates, there was
a contemporaneous and perhaps even earlier movement among indigenous peoples.
A definitive account of the origins of the global civil society movement is not an
objective of this paper, however, and might not even be possible, given that the
movement seems to have sprung up from many relatively independent social
arenas.
40 E.g., JAMES N. ROSENAU & ERNST-OTTO CZEMPIEL, EDS., GOVERNANCE
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (1992).
41 ASEEM PRAKASH & JEFFREY A. HART, EDS., GLOBALIZATION AND
GOVERNANCE (1999).
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society movements were coalescing into a general, world-wide one.42
The goals, methods, networks, and social roles of the European civil
society movement were increasingly linked to those of the indigenous
peoples' network described at the beginning of this section and to
other social movement networks around the world.43 Implicitly
attributing the movement with institutional durability, academics and
activists alike began to talk about "international" and "transnational"
and even "global" civil society. Thus, although the civil society had
been conceived, born, and raised inside territorially bounded states, it
leapt the bounds of the states, and arguably the received conceptual
framework as well. What, exactly, is distinctive about "global" civil
society? According to Falk and Strauss, it is, quite simply,
globalization:
Globalization has generated an emergent global civil society
composed of transnational business, labor, media, religious, and
issue-oriented citizen advocacy networks... In one of the most
significant, if not yet fully appreciated, developments of the post-
Cold War era, global civil society--operating in collaboration
with certain like-minded states-has become a formidable
political presence in international life, pushing forward several
key progressive initiatives in the international arena.
42 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS
(1998).
43 PAUL WAPNER, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND WORLD CIVIC POLITICS
(1996); KECK & SIKKINK supra note 43; Lucy Taylor, Globalization and Civil
Society-Continuities, Ambiguities, and Realities in Latin America, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 269, 269-95 (1999); THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY (Ann M. Florini, ed., 2000). Nonetheless, as
Taylor and Seligman illustrate, there were still significant differences in the causes
of those using the term. Seligman argues that whereas in the East it was used to
advance the cause of individualism, in the West it was used to advance the cause
of communitarianism. ADAM SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 203 (1992).
Taylor provides an illuminating description of the typical differences between
locally based social movements and internationally based NGOs in Latin America.
44 Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples
Assembly: Legitimacy & the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INTL'L L.
191, 194 (2000). The initiatives they refer to include the global climate change
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Facilitating Elements
Since globalization is a broad and somewhat wooly concept,
it is helpful to list a few factors that seem to be key in the
globalization of civil society. My goal is not to offer a persuasive
causal account of globalization, nor even to rank factors in importance
or time. Rather, it is to indicate that they have played causal roles and
remain important characteristics of global civil society. These factors
also play a central role in framing the strengths and weaknesses of
global civil society regulatory programs.
Global Information Technologies: As Professors Lyons and
Mohawk pointed out in the mid-80s, the rapid development of global
information technologies was a critical factor in the creation of
transnational coalitions and organizations. Included are technologies
for gathering information (from traditional cameras to television
cameras to satellite imaging to various kinds of emerging "real-time"
sensors) and for communicating it (international newspapers and
telecommunications systems, global television, the internet, and so
on).
Critically important is the growing capacity of transnational
advocacy groups to gather information, sometimes amounting to
serious research, and communicate it on their own. Particularly
important is their capacity to connect internationally marketed
products to the local conditions under which they are produced. 5
framework convention, the convention outlawing anti-personnel land mines, and
the agreement to establish an international criminal court. The authors go on to
argue that the time is ripe for a "global peoples' assembly." id at 196-204.
43 Peter Evans, Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks:
Counter-Hegemonic Globalization, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 230,234 (2000). As Conca
(2001) points out, this capacity to connect production conditions to consumption
is made all the more essential by the enormous 'distancing' of production from
consumption that comes with the creation of global production and consumption
chains. Without the ability to create informational feedback loops, the capacity of
civil society--or of governments, for that matter-to define, publicize, and attempt
to ameliorate problems created by global production processes would continually
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These information technologies remain crucial to the operation of
global civil society.
Transnational Economic Structures: It is a clich6 that we live
in a global economy, but a profoundly important one. The worldwide
flow of raw materials and products, the integration of financial
markets, the growth in multi-national firms and business alliances,
and the creation integrated production chains running around the
world, which are driving forces in globalization, also facilitate the
emergence of global civil society. The emergence of worldwide
production and consumption chains has increased the scope of both
transnational interdependence and the externalities associated with
market activities. People living on one side of the globe are
increasingly dependent on decisions mtade on the other side. Decisions
made on one side can have significant "external" effects on the other.
Such external effects can vary from the apparent reduction in
employment in one region caused by increased employment in
another, and perhaps increased profits in still another, to sea-level
rises in low lying areas caused by fossil fuel burning and deforestation
in other areas. One of the most striking current examples is the
contamination of the arctic food chain by chemicals used as pesticides
in temperate and tropical countries."
In every case, actions taken in one governmental jurisdiction
give rise to assertions of interest and grievance by people living
lose ground to globalization.
46 Innuit activist Sheila Watt-Cloutier put the case as concisely as possible:
"I wonder how we have created a global situation where mothers in the Arctic
worry about poisoning their children through their very life-giving breast milk,
while mothers in other countries rely on these same chemicals to protect their
children from disease. This situation is not only immoral, but must be deemed
intolerable." Deneen L. Brown, Arctic Canada's Silent Invader: Contamination
Threatens Native People's Way ofLife in Fragile Region, WASHINGTON POST, May
17,2001, at A 17. Widespread agreement on this assertion is leading to the adoption
of the Treaty on Persistent Organic Pollutants, one of the few recent instances in
which the intergovernmental policy system shows promise of responding
effectively to transnational civil society movements.
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outside that jurisdiction. Often, they choose to pursue correctives
outside the intergovernmental negotiation network through trans-
national civil society networks. The very interdependence created by
transnational production and consumption chains gives civil society
actors located in one governmental jurisdiction leverage over behavior
in others.47
At the same time, the difficulty of exerting that leverage is
increased by the complex nature of the economic relationships. Often,
a multitude of individual firms are tied together by temporary, shifting
relationships in which power and authority are dispersed along the
production chain, only occasionally concentrating at the retail end."
Reduced Roles of Governments: Although the causes and
degree are subject to debate, it is quite apparent that governments have
scaled back their ambitions as guarantors of public welfare in recent
decades. To some extent this may be a function of the growth of the
transnational economic system described above, which leap-frogs
governmental jurisdictions and can punish governments that try to
enforce a high degree of social accountability. Recurrent internal
fiscal crises have also been important, as have "neo-liberal" political
attacks on visions of protective government. In any case, the reduced
ambitions of governments have made room for expanded ambitions
of civil society organizations,49 and perhaps even created a demand for
47 E.g., Evans supra note 45; Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor
Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve
Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REVIEW 26(1) (February/March 2001),
available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR26.1/fung.html; KECK & SIKKINK,
supra note 42.
48 Ken Conca, Consumption and Environment in a Global Economy,
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 1(3) 53-71 (2001); Gary Gereffi, The
Organization of Buyer Driven Global Commodity Chains: How US. Retailers
Shape Overseas Production Networks, in COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL
CAPITALISM (Gary Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds., 1994).
49 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Regulation for the Rest of Us? Activists, Capital,
States and the Demand for Global Social Regulation (Feb. 20-24, 2001) (paper
presented to the International Studies Association Conference, Chicago, available
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them. Some governments have even invited civil society organizations
to take over a larger role in public governance.50
Salient Characteristics
Lipschutz's path breaking article started with a relatively open-
ended definition of global civil society: "a set of interactions among an
imagined community51 to shape collective life that are not confined to
the territorial and institutional spaces of States."52 Today, the website of
the LSE Centre for Global Governance lists about a half dozen
definitions.53 They are basically consistent with Lipschutz's, but tend to
add specific features. Most of the additional features are portrayed as
typical rather than necessary,54 and are described further in the next
at http://people.ucsc.edu/-rlipsch/Regulation%20for%20the%2ORest
%20of/o20Us.html.)
50 Taylor, supra note 43, at 285-86. In United States domestic policy this
tendency has taken a new twist with the Bush administration, which has sought to
create a larger role for "faith-based organizations" in the design and delivery of
domestic government programs. Rallying the Armies of Compassion, Jan. 2001,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/reports/faithbased.html.
51 The term "imagined community" is used not to imply that those who think
of themselves as part of the community are deceiving themselves, but rather to note
that the community's existence requires people to think of themselves as members
of it. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983).
52 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Restructuring World Politics: The Emergence of
Global Civil Society, 21 MILLENNIUM 389, 398 (1992).
53 LSE Centre for the Study of Global Governance, Definitions of Global
Civil Society, available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Yearbook
/definitions.htm; Mary Kaldor, A Note on Concepts (Feb. 4-5,2000) (paper for the
Global Civil Society Almanac Brainstorming session, on file with author).
54 Id. An extensive definition is attributed to John Keane: "a complex,
conflict ridden, transnational process in which, across vast distances and despite
considerable time barriers, individuals, non-governmental groups and organiza-
tions, charities, lobby groups, citizen's initiatives, local independent media,
corporations, [and] trade unions non-violently self-organize and interact in ever
more networked ways, usually with and against state and non-state bodies, to alter,
even to 'denaturalize' the power relations embedded in existing social and political
orders, even to create shared understandings among actors that we live in an
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section. They include (1) self-organization, (2) semi-autonomous
engagement with state agencies, (3) non-violence, (4) a frequently high
degree of social contestation, and (5) networked structures.
Forest Certification and Global Civil Society
It requires little analysis to see that the above conception of
global civil society is generally congruent with the world of forest
certification. The primary purpose of this paper is not to offer a
thoroughgoing analysis of forest certification in terms of civil society
constructs, or to 'test' whether global civil society models fit forest
certification better than other models. Rather, the purpose is to see
how the global civil society attributes of forest certification can help
us understand its policy implications and its relationship to law.
Therefore, this section combines civil society scholarship with
specific information about forest certification programs to create as
sharp an image as possible of forest certification as a global civil
society phenomenon.
Actors and Organization
Forestry has long been a sector laying claim to social trustee-
ship, with many western societies according foresters special status as
guardians of public values. 5 Forestry also has had important
transnational dimensions for a long time, because much forestry
culture has been transmitted around the globe from countries like
Germany and (much later) the United States through professional
education. In general, the forestry sector has enjoyed a high degree of
professional and operational autonomy, often combined with cordial
or even close relations with government. When the movement for
forest certification emerged, the forestry establishment was suffering
emerging transnational, even 'global order'."
55 GREGORY A. BARTON, EMPIRE FORESTRY AND THE ORIGINS OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM (forthcoming).
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a rapid decline in public trust. The decline was tied largely to public
perceptions that forests were being harvested at unsustainable speeds,
or often simply destroyed. Although North American forests were
rapidly being clear-cut, deforestation of tropical forests probably
brought the process to a head. The process I discussed with Professors
Lyons and Mohawk regarding Brazil was being replicated with local
variations in other parts of South America, Asia, and Africa, with
many communities losing their land and traditional source of
livelihood. 6 As it grew increasingly clear that the traditional system
of intergovernmental negotiation was incapable of addressing the
tropical deforestation problem, there was a broad search for alternative
solutions. One strategy that took off was forest certification. 7
Although the history of forest certification remains contested,
it is clear that the prime mover was and is the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC), founded in 1993 but planned for several years before
that. Organized by a loose alliance of North American furniture
makers, environmental organizations, and foundations, the FSC was
designed to operate without government participation. Initially it may
have been conceived as an environmentalist-industry partnership," but
the industry role was relatively limited, and the FSC quickly evolved
into a "multi-stakeholder organization" which its founding Executive
Director insistently distinguishes from an NGO.59
In the eight years since its founding, the FSC has developed an
elaborate, formalized stakeholder structure. Its primary governing
56 SOLON BARRACLOUGH & KRISHNA B. GHIMIRE, AGRICULTURAL
EXPANSION AND TROPICAL DEFORESTATION: POVERTY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND LAND USE (2000).
57 Jem Bendell & David F. Murphy, Planting the Seeds of Change:
Business-NGO Relations on Tropical Deforestation, in TERMS FOR ENDEARMENT:
BUSINESS, NGOs AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2000); Elliott, supra note 3.
58 Bendell & Murphy, supra note 57.
59 Tim Synott, Forest Stewardship Council, AC, in DEFINING A FOREST
VISION: WORLD WILDLIFE FUND'S NORTH AMERICAN FORESTS FOR LIFE
CONFERENCE (Kathleen Kessler et al., 1998). For historical accounts of the Forest
Stewardship Council and the American Forest and Paper Association Sustainable
Forestry Initiative, see Meidinger, supra note 4.
2002-2003]
238 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.10
body is an international "general assembly" composed of three
chambers--environmental, economic, and social-holding equal
voting power. Each chamber is further divided into a northern and
southern sub-chamber, again with equal voting power. Among other
things, the general assembly is responsible for approving regional and
national forest management standards developed by regional and
national working groups.
Its other primary function is the accreditation of certifiers, who
have the formal role of determining whether forest management
enterprises meet FSC standards. I have suggested that the role of
certifiers is sufficiently significant that they might be viewed as the
"judges" of the FSC system.6 ° They certainly perform functions
similar in kind and importance to those of many administrative law
judges in government licensing and permitting proceedings.
Membership in the FSC is voluntary, although each applicant must
find at least two existing members to support its application. The FSC
currently has over 450 members, approximately two-thirds of which
are organizations.6
The FSC has provoked the rapid development of contending
certification systems, some of which claim to have predated the FSC,
but none of which did so in the form of a functioning certification
program. The different programs are too complicated and variable to
describe in detail here.62 It suffices to note that some, such as the
60 Errol Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and US.
EnvironmentalLaw: Closer than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162, 10164
(2001).
61 Forest Stewardship Council, supra note 4.
62 See generally, Steven Bass and Markku Simula, Independent
Certification/Verification of Forest Management (1999) (Background paper
prepared for the World Bank/WWF Alliance Workshop, Washington, D.C., Nov.
9-10, 1999) (available at http://www.esd.worldbank.org/wwf/sim-bass.doc); Eric
Hansen & Heikki Juslin, The Status of Forest Certification In The ECE Region
(1999) (paper prepared for the UN-ECE/FAO, Geneva) (available at
http://www.unece.org/trade/timber/docs/certification/dp- 1 4.pdf); Meidinger, supra
note 4; Sprang, supra note 3.
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Sustainable Forestry Initiative ("SFI,")6 3 of the American Forest &
Paper Association ("AF&PA"), are closely aligned with the forest
products industry. Others, such as the Pan European Forest
Certification Council ("PEFC,"), 64 are also industry based, but involve
a much larger government role, reflecting the traditionally close
cooperation between government and the forestry industry in Europe.
Depending on how one counts, there are anywhere between a half-
dozen and fifteen different certification programs.65
All of the forest certification programs self-consciously
operate in a larger context best described as a sprawling, largely
unmapped, highly changeable, loosely networked social field in which
there are several centers of activity that closely monitor each other. It
includes many environmental organizations, large and small produc-
tion, wholesale, and retail firms, trade associations, professional
certifiers, labor unions, human rights organizations, indigenous
groups, government agencies and officials, consultants, charitable
organizations, citizen activists, academics, research institutes, commu-
nity groups,66 and undoubtedly many other types of actors. Simply
categorizing all of the participants is a serious exercise in social
theory.67 Relations among them involve a complex, shifting mix of
63 See AF & PA 2001 Sustainable Forestry Program Overview, available at
http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/si/SFIARSummary.2.pdf.
64 See The Pan European Forest Certification Program, available at
http://www.pefc.org; Sprang, supra note 3.
65 Confederation of European Paper Industries, Comparative Matrix of
Forest Certification Schemes, available at http://www.cepi.org/htdocs/
pdfs/forest/puba 15.pdf.
66 Lucy Taylor provides an extremely insightful analysis of the ways in
which social movement community groups have become linked to each other as
well as to transnational NGOs and funding sources in course of the global civil
society movement. She also describes some of the ways in which social movement
organizations have had to transform themselves to deal with the more ambiguous,
less clearly good versus bad problems that have come with the democratization of
many Latin American governments. Taylor, supra note 43, at 283-86.
67 E.g., Christopher Elliott & Rudolphe Schlaepfer, GlobalGovernance and
Forest Certification: A Fast Track Process for Policy Change, in SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF FOREST CERTIFICATION 199 (Errol Meidinger et al. Eds.,
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mutual observation, direct communication, trust, distrust, mutual
adjustment, cooperation, coordination, and competition. All of the
actors are clearly aware that they are part of a larger arena of forest
governance and regulation. It is possible (but not clear) that shared
educational experiences are also an important source of linkage.
Empirical research characterizing these relationships and their history
would help considerably in understanding the governance capacity of
the network, as it has in the case of ozone policy networks.68
The forest certification network is linked to other civil society
policy arenas, such as labor, human rights, and community
development in a variety of ways, including shared members, funding
sources, communications channels, and in some cases political goals.
The forest certification network is also linked to specifically
certification-oriented activities in other policy arenas, apparently
reflecting a growing focus on organizational methods and techniques
in global civil society at large. The linkages occur both through the
exchange of information, ideas, and sometimes resources, 69 and
through participation in organizations such as the giant International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the tiny International Social
Environmental Accreditation Labelling Alliance, 0 and the inter-
mediate European Organization for Conformity Assessment (EOTC).
2003); Benjamin Cashore, Response to 'Global Governance and Forest
Certification: A Fast Track Process for Policy Change', in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
DIMENSIONS OF FOREST CERTIFICATION 219 (Errol Meidinger et al. Eds., 2003).
68 PENELOPE CANAN & NANCY REICHMAN, OZONE CONNECTIONS: EXPERT
NETWORKS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2002).
69 Russel Dalton & Robert Rohrschneider, Transnational Environmentalism:
Do Environmental Groups Cooperate Globally? (1999) (research paper) (available
at http://democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/dalton3.htm).
70 ISEAL (2001), at www.isealailiance.org; Errol Meidinger, Emerging
Trans-Sectoral Regulatory Structures in Global Civil Society (Jul. 4-7, 2001)
(paper prepared for the Tools for Regulation Panel, Joint Annual Meetings of the
Law and Society Association and the Research Committees for the Sociology of
Law, Budapest Hungary) (available at http://law.buffalo.edu/
homepage/eemeid/scholarship/ISEAL.pdf).
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Large foundations also appear to provide important linkages among
social and environmental labeling organizations.
Substantive Values
As noted above, civil society organizations generally promote
particular values. For the most part, these tend to include social justice
elements and at least some concept of the proper ordering of society.
In the forest certification arena, most if not all actors embrace the
value of "sustainable forest management." The question is, what
constitutes sustainable forest management? There is considerable
disagreement with regard to this question, as some groups promote
more environmentally protective standards while others promote less
protective ones, some promote community oriented standards while
others promote industry oriented ones, and so on.
There are several other interesting commonalities in value,
however. First, many actors in the arena behave as though they believe
that a si le definition of sustainable forest management is both
possible and desirable. Such an assumption does not seem to
characterize most other policy arenas.7 If my characterization of the
forest certification network is correct, it is hard to say why that would
be so. One possibility is that forestry is such a long-standing and
heavily professionalized sector of civil society that many participants
have been socialized into the shared assumption that there are
71 Indeed, Matthias Finger argues that one of the major shortcomings in the
emerging global system in which international NGOs play an expanded role is a
dissolution of shared values: "Substantive political objectives,... such as equity,
justice, and human rights, are increasingly replaced by expressive objectives, that
is, basically the call of various actors for the right to express themselves". Matthias
Finger, NGOs and Transformation: Beyond Social Movement Theory, in
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN WORLD POLITICS: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE
GLOBAL, 57 (T. Princen & M. Finger eds., 1994). This, of course is an empirical
assertion that could be empirically tested, although to my knowledge it has not
been. It is also possible that international environmental NGOs have realized the
need to coalesce around shared objectives, and have started to do so since Finger
wrote.
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generally correct policies and decisions. A second possibility, more
grandiose but potentially shared with other civil society movements,
is that humankind as a whole holds certain fundamental values that
civil society organizations should promote. This might be similar to
the "conscience of humanity" standard invoked in civil society debates
on human rights and peace and possibly to natural justice" and
social contract 4 analyses, which are receiving renewed attention in
environmental policy circles.
A second area of convergence in certification programs is that
the definitions of sustainable forest management espoused by the
various actors seem to have moved in tandem with each other over
time. In broad outline, they have moved from a "sustained yield" or
"cropping" conception of forestry (in which the goal was to provide
a constant and predictable stream of outputs-usually timber), to an
ecologically-oriented one (in which the goal was to preserve the
72 E.g., Richard Falk, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the New
Jurisprudence of Global CivilSociety, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 333,
349 (1997); E. BARKAN, THE GUILT OFNATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000). Interestingly and importantly, substantial evidence
from opinion polls indicates that there is essentially global agreement on the
necessity of protecting the environment. The level of support for environmental
protection, including the willingness to accept added costs, does not seem to vary
significantly among affluent and less affluent nations. RILEY DUNLAP ET AL.,
HEALTH OF THE PLANET SURVEY (1993); Dalton & Rohrschneider, supra note 69;
There is a related idea in the traditional corpus of international law,
which holds that nation states are under an inherent obligation to the
international community (erga omnes) not to engage in aggression,
genocide, slavery, or racial discrimination-and possibly to safeguard
the earth's ecological balance. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 25 (2000).
73 Richard D. Schwartz, Natural Law (Jul. 7, 200 1) (paper presented to the
Joint Annual Meetings of the Law & Society Association and the Research
Committee for the Sociology of Law, Budapest, Hungary) (on file with author).
74 Joseph F.C. Dimento, Process, Norms, Compliance, and International
Environmental Law (Jul. 4-7,2001) (paper presented to the Joint Annual Meetings
of the Law and Society Association and Research Committee for the Sociology of
Law, Budapest, Hungary) (copy on file with author).
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structure, function, and composition of forest ecosystems), to one
explicitly linking the viability of forests to that of local communities
and other social groups that depend on them. This pattern suggests
that there is a broad value dialogue in the certification arena. Indeed,
much academic work has been devoted to comparisons between the
standards of various certification programs, evidently based on the
assumption that they can be evaluated according to a common
metric." Moreover, some researchers argue that certification systems
have a built in tendency to compete with each other, thereby
"ratcheting up" definitions of best practice.
76
Third, the values being promoted are not limited to matters of
trees and ecosystems, but also, as in other policy arenas, include
visions of the "od society." The guiding principles and formal
organization of the Forest Stewardship Council, for example, express
a commitment to protecting the viability of forest communities and
the health and employment of forest workers. They can be understood
as one expression of the vision of"sustainable development"--linking
environmental, economic, and social viability-that has grown out of
the global discussion of environment and society in recent decades.
Conversely, the standards of the AF&PA's SFI program do not
include comparable responsibilities to communities and workers.
Rather, they stress the autonomy and economic viability of individual
firms, implicitly asserting that the most sustainable system will be the
one that retains maximum autonomy for business. The ISO, similarly
and more emphatically, makes the firm the center of environmental
policy making.77 In sum, each certification program encodes and
promotes a vision of proper social ordering, and thus seeks to change
or reinforce patterns of authority well beyond forestry.
73 E.g., CEPI, supra note 65 ; Ewald Rametsteiner, Sustainable Forest
Management Certification-Frame Conditions, System Designs and Impact
Assessment (2000) (paper prepared for Ministerial Conference on the Protection
of Forests in Europe, Liasion Unit Vienna, Vienna, Austria) (on file with author).
76 Fung et al., supra note 47.
77 See generally Meidinger, supra note 4.
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Methods
Kaldor argues that the modem civil society movement is
characterized as much by particular methods of organization and
policy making, as by substantive ideals.78 This certainly seems to be
true for forest certification programs, and probably for a much larger
subset of contemporary civil society movements. Of course, the
central idea of forest certification is itself an organizational technique
involving the application of publicly announced standards to indi-
vidual forest enterprises by social actors with defined responsibilities.
Beyond this, however, the certification movement might well be
characterized as an agglomeration of linked methods and techniques
that are relied upon to some extent by all forest certification programs.
The first is stakeholder oriented policy making. Individual
certification programs vary greatly in the amount and locus of
78 Kaldor, supra note 38, at 475-76. With regard to Eastern Europe, Kaldor
cites especially a reliance on (1) self-organization, (2) non-violent protest, (3)
dialogue, and (4) compromise. While these methods also seem to characterize
forest certification, their importance as markers may not be as great as they are in
Kaldor's implicit contrast to state based processes. Defining self-organization in
the conventional sense as phenomena which appear to determine their own form
and processes, one can look around forest certification arena and describe much of
it as self-organized. Humberto Maturana & Francisco Varella, Autopoiesis and
Cognition: The Realization of the Living, in 42 BOSTON STUDIES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1980). The Forest Stewardship Council, after all, simply
started itself up and declared itself to be in the business of accrediting certifiers and
approving certification standards, and did so according to procedures set by itself.
People and organizations then proceeded to join and otherwise participate in FSC
processes. Similarly, the PanEuropean Forest Certification Council and possibly
even the American Forest &Paper Association's Sustainable Forestry Initiative
could be described as self-organized. Yet the programs, particularly the PEFC and
SFI, were built in considerable part by pre-existing organizations and interests and
based on long-standing views of sustainable forest management. So the question
arises, self-organized in relation to what? Depending on one's perspective, it is
possible to portray forest certification either as primarily self-organized or as a
natural outgrowth of long-term processes. The same kind of critique applies to the
methods of non-violence, dialogue, and compromise. All are common attributes,
but only part of the story.
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participation, but all require it somewhere and to some extent. The
FSC system is by far the most elaborate, with the three-chamber,
north-south structure discussed above, along with considerable public
input requirements in the regional standard setting processes and
individual certifications. Yet, despite its far reaching implementation
of stakeholder models, there are places where the FSC system remains
strikingly non-participatory and non-transparent, particularly at the
level of the individual certification.79 The programmatic vision,
however, is broader and seems to be moving toward realization.
On the other end of the spectrum is the ISO8 family of
processes, including the AF&PA Sustainable Forestry Initiative,8 all
of which require some public comment process, and some of which
have occasionally utilized focus groups, but little more. Even in these
programs, however, the boundaries are becoming more permeable.
Actors outside firms are increasingly likely to be conceptualized as
stakeholders. And it usually seems possible, if often difficult and
costly, for interested parties to gain at least some input to decision
processes. The growing use of stakeholder processes may reflect
larger "transnational democratic tendencies" that Falk describes as a
"feature of the international legal order at the end of the 20th
century". 82 But this assessment remains a bit optimistic at the moment,
and much remains to be seen regarding the role of stakeholder
processes in certification programs.
A second method common to forest certification programs is
a heavy reliance on science and professional expertise, both for
defining standards and for legitimating them. The field is at least as
powerfully shaped by the professional views of foresters and
ecologists as are state-based regulatory systems-perhaps more so. A
79 See Meidinger, supra note 4, at 160, 179; Eckhard Rehbinder, Ecological
Contracts: Agreements Between Polluters and Local Communities, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY (Gunther Teubner, et al.
eds., 2001).
so ISO (2001), at www.ico.ch.
8S AF & PA, supra note 63.
82 Falk, supra note 72, at 334.
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large part of the debate about certification standards is framed in
scientific terms. For example, the debates about clear felling and
chemical use focus heavily on the effects they are predicted to have on
forests. Scientists assert a special relationship with the future in
making arguments about alternative policies,83 and most of the key
actors in the field are scientifically trained. At the same time, there
seems to be a widely held sense that science cannot fully resolve the
questions at stake, and that they will necessarily involve value
judgments and the balancing of interests.
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that juxtaposed with
science and expertise is the third method common to certification
programs: use of public relations and marketing techniques. These
have included shaming mechanisms such as public protests, picket
lines, mock "chain saw massacres" outside retail stores, announce-
ments over store intercoms extolling the store's record of destroying
rain forests, and so on.84 They have also included standard marketing
techniques such as focus group testing, mass media advertisements 5
and trade fairs, as well as public commendations, the most important
of which is the eco-label itself. The eco-label is intended to signify
"good," "responsible, "sustainable," or sometimes even "exemplary"
forest management, depending on the program. It is used to mark a
product for the public as having environmentally and sometimes
socially appropriate origins, a 'pedigree,' as it were. Thus, a piece of
certified mahogany can be distinguished from an apparently identical
piece that might have been produced in violation of a sustainable
management plan, environmental laws, native land rights, or worker
83 Inger-Johanne Sand, Drawing Upon the Future: Socio-Legal Theories,
Risk, and the Application of Specialised Knowledge (2001) (ARENA working
paper, University of Oslo, Norway) (on file with author)
84 Bendell & Murphy, supra note 57; Jim Carlton, Against the Grain: How
Home Depot andActivists Joined to Cut Logging Abuse, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Sept. 26, 2000, at A12.
85 The FSC, for example, has placed advertisements featuring Pierce
Brosnan and Olivia Newton-John in People and Playboy magazines. The AF&PA
is planning a major $25 million ad campaign as this is written. Kim & Carlton,
supra note 28.
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safety laws, depending on the certification program. The purpose of
the label is to enhance access to consumers by sellers of properly
produced products while reducing access by sellers of improperly
produced ones. Similar labeling strategies have appeared in many
other sectors, including foods, textiles, and a whole set of "fair trade"
products for which primary producers are certified to have been paid
a living wage and accorded locally appropriate labor standards.86
Labels are becoming so important that the ISO and EU have devoted
major efforts to developing guidelines for them, 7 and at least one
separate alliance of environmental and social labeling organizations
has emerged. 8
A fourth important organizational methodology is the use of
environmental management system (EMSs) to pursue the objectives of
certification programs. The central idea is that each forest management
organization should develop a system for considering its environmental
impacts, planning which ones to reduce and how, implementing the
plan, monitoring its success, and making adjustments over time.89 These
processes must be formally provided for by the organization, and
particular individuals assigned responsibility for carrying them out. The
86 See generally Janelle Diller, A Social Conscience in the Global
Marketplace? Labour Dimensions of Codes of Conduct, Social Labelling, and
Investor Initiatives, 138 INT'L LAB. REV. 99, 99-129 (1999).
87 . ISO, supra note 80; European Organization for Conformity Assessment
(2001), at http://www.eotc.be.
8 ISEAL, supra note 70.
89 Ironically, as noted in the section on adaptability, environmental
management systems seem to constitute the main opportunity for implementing
adaptive management in certification programs. The basic idea of adaptive
management is that social organizations should consider their goals, plan how to
meet them, implement their plans, monitor their performance, reconsider their
plans, and make appropriate changes. KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE:
INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993). At the
broader programmatic level, certification systems seem not to have established
mechanisms for adaptive management. Although it could turn out that the larger
debate about sustainable forest management will play part of that role, at present
certification systems have not made plans for monitoring and revising their own
performance.
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FSC has placed relatively low emphasis on management systems to
date, evidently out of a desire not to make it too difficult for small,
indigenous, or community based enterprises to attain certification. Many
EMS requirements include a commitment to "continuous improvement"
(although there is contention about what must be improved-the
management system or organizational performance) and to compliance
with applicable laws. Thus, the basic idea of the EMS is to harness the
organizational dynamics of the forest management enterprise to the
objectives of the certification program.
Fifth, certification programs use formal principles and law-like
codes to define their standards and structure their operations. These
are exemplified by the FSC's hierarchical system of principles and
criteria, indicators, and national standards, as well as its many statutes,
procedural requirements, and the like.9" For example, FSC Principle
6 provides as follows:
Forest management shall conserve biological diversity and its
associated values, water resources, soils, and unique and fragile
ecosystems and landscapes, and, by so doing, maintain the
ecological functions and the integrity of the forest.9
That principle is then given concrete meaning in regional standards
and criteria, such as the following draft criterion from the northeastern
region of the US:
Management systems shall promote the development and
adoption of environmentally friendly non-chemical methods of
pest management and strive to avoid the use of chemical
pesticides. World Health Organization Type IA and lB and
chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides; pesticides that are persistent,
toxic or whose derivatives remain biologically active and
accumulate in the food chain beyond their intended use; as well
as any pesticides banned by international agreement, shall be
prohibited. If chemicals are used, proper equipment and training
shall be provided to minimize health and environmental risks.
90 Forest Stewardship Council, supra note 4.
93 Id.
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Aside from being stricter, this criterion is effectively
indistinguishable from the regulations promulgated by government
environmental regulatory agencies, and there are over a hundred other
such criteria for each region. Thus, the reliance on legal forms for
managing the FSC program is considerable. Although other forest
certification programs tend to be less formally elaborate and specific,
all of them appear to be moving in the direction of increased
codification. The codes cover the operation of both the certification
program and the certified organizations, defining a broad range of
roles and responsibilities for the actors. Again, the use of principles
and codes is being replicated in many areas of civil society, including
human rights, labor standards, and fair trade. There are countless
organizations involved in developing codes and implementation
systems and in assessing compliance."2
Finally, forest certification programs increasingly rely on what
they define as 'independent, third-party certifiers' to assure
compliance with their principles, criteria, and standards. Different
programs have different ways of accrediting certifiers and defining
their independence. Some do not require third-party certification.93
But they all are moving toward the use of third party certifiers, and the
underlying principle seems to be gaining ground in the forestry arena.
As with the other methods described above, the use of independent
92 For a brief description of the certification organizations involved in the
International Social and Environmental Labelling Alliance, see Errol Meidinger,
Emerging Trans-Sectoral Regulatory Structures in Global Civil Society: The Case
of ISEAL (the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling
Alliance) (2001) (paper prepared for the Tools for Regulation Panel, Joint Annual
Meetings of the Law and Society Association and the Research Committee for the
Sociology of Law, July 4-7, Budapest, Hungary) available at http://law.buffalo.edu
/homepage/eemeid/scholarship/SEAL.pdf.
93 Certification is commonly classified as either first-party (self-
certification), second-party (typically a trade association or customer), third-party
(a separate certification organization) and even fourth-party (a government or
multilateral agency). Gary Gereffi et al., The NGO-Industrial Complex, FOREIGN
POLICY, July-Aug. 2001, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
issuejulyaug_2001/gereffi.html.
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certifiers or auditors seems to be gaining ground in other civil society
sectors as well.
Role in Global Society
The overall picture that emerges is one of forest certification
in particular and civil society in general replicating and expanding the
kind of regulation often performed by governments, and extending it
to a transnational level. In doing this, civil society organizations do
not focus on lobbying governmental or inter-governmental agencies;
rather, they create their own systems to operate in parallel with
governmental ones. They often take a primary role in defining
problems, conceptualizing solutions, and shaping public culture,
consistent with Finger's portrayal of international environmental
NGOs generally,9 4 but also go on to establish implementation
structures for their programs." Of course, the civil society regulatory
system's coverage is spotty and its efficacy untested, but the basic
pattern and impulse are evident. The key reasons for the growth of
civil society regulation are described in the "facilitating elements"
section above: global information technology, global economic
integration, and reduced government capacity.
Governments have a particularly difficult time establishing
regulation at the global level because there are a huge number of
factors that can derail negotiations when each state must consent to be
bound and when there are many issues of contention among the states.
94 Finger, supra note 71, at 60.
95 Meidinger, supra note 4; Erika N. Sasser, The Certification Solution:
NGO Promotion of Private, Voluntary Self-Regulation (May 29-31, 2002) (paper
prepared for the 74th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science
Association, Toronto).
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Transnational certification programs arguably have a better oppor-
tunity because they focus on a narrower range of issues and have
fewer veto points.96
Still, the situation is more complicated than forest certification
displacing government regulation of transnational problems for
efficiency reasons. First, certification programs appear to have stimu-
lated increased activity and innovation by government agencies as well,
engaging them in sustainable forest management debates and sometimes
in mounting their own certification programs. Second, a growing
number of governments are subjecting the forests they manage to
certification, evidently using the process to improve either the quality
or the legitimacy of their management. Thus, certification programs can
be seen as regulating both businesses and governments. 97
Third, certification programs do not necessarily displace
government regulatory programs; rather, they tend to incorporate them
and extend them. All certification programs require efforts to comply
with applicable government made laws. At least in the near term,
therefore, certification programs can be seen as likely to strengthen
governmental regulatory programs where they exist, and possibly to
lay the groundwork for them where they do not.9" This raises the
possibility that forest certification should not be seen so much as a
corrective or a challenge to governmental legal systems, but more as
96 Conversely, Picciotto suggests that they may be at a relative disadvantage
because they not have the option of achieving compromise solutions based on
trade-offs. Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration:
Fragmented States andthe Dilemmas ofNeo-Liberalism, 17 INT'L L. & Bus. 10 14,
1045 (1997).
97 For a conceptual analysis of the various ways in which governmental,
business, and non-governmental organizations regulate one another, see Colin
Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional
Design, 2001 PUB. L. 329, 329-53 (2001).
98 This hypothesis raises a problem that should be mentioned now, although
it cannot be meaningfully addressed in this paper: which governmental regulatory
systems will certification further? Not all of them are the same. Does global forest
certification privilege particular concepts of proper forest management,
presumptively North American and European ones?
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an extension and amplification of them. To consider this possibility
further, it is necessary to lay some conceptual foundations regarding
the role of law in civil society.
Law and Civil Society
Domestic
The relationship of law to civil society has usually been either
ambiguous or contested. The Greeks and Romans took the rule of law
to be essential to civil society, but had a multitude of theories about
the source of law. During the feudal period, the guilds and other urban
corporate bodies that gave rise to civil society played a large role in
making and enforcing rules. As the nation states solidified their
authority and created separate forums for authoritative law making,
they generally endorsed and adopted guild and community made rules,
but also gradually revised them to provide interregional consistency,
pursue their own goals, and accommodate new conditions.99 Concur-
rently, the nation states asserted a monopoly on the authority to make
binding laws. Legal theorists assisted that effort by developing a
supporting rationale, systematizing law at the level of the nation state
(particularly in civil law countries), and establishing elite 'national'
law schools.
Since the late 18th century, the assumption that law necessarily
emanates from a sovereign state has become deeply embedded in both
Civil and Anglo-American legal thought. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that modem commentators often take as given that the law
of civil society is made by nation states, and that nation states must be
urged by civil society actors-petitioned by them-to make laws
supporting civil society in the first place and to implement civil
society agendas in the second.'
In practice, however, the situation has always been more
99 GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 78-79 (1978).
100 E.g., Mertus, supra note 27, at 1338-339; Etzioni, supra note 31 at 356-57.
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complex. Continental legal scholars such as Ehrlich... and Heller 0 2
pointed out that law must take on meaning from the context in which
it is implemented; people give meaning to legal terms by the
inevitably variable ways in which they live and organize themselves
to implement them. Heller explained this difficult argument as
follows: "The very same general court structure proclaimed by Josef
II would lead in Austria to a written and mediated court procedure, but
in the Netherlands to an oral and immediate one".'0° Thus, civil
society necessarily has a role in 'making' law, even when the official
source of law is the state. Weber took the argument a major step
further by arguing that law means little unless it is accorded
legitimacy by society, and that it must therefore be made with the goal
of legitimacy in mind.'0 4 Thus again, actors outside the state
necessarily shape the law given to them by the state because the state
must tailor it to gain their acquiescence.
Although Anglo American systems never adopted the
positivist view as completely as the civil law systems, their courts,
legislatures and administrative agencies came over time to be seen as
the exclusive sources of law. The American legal realists of the
1920s-1950s, however, countered by arguing that much law was in
fact made outside government bodies. For example, a contract
between employer and employee was legally binding and enforceable
by government agencies without significant government input as to its
terms. The parties therefore could be seen as defining the substantive
content of law, and hence as exercising delegated state power. Not
101 E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
(Arno Press 1975) (1913).
102 H. HELLER, STAATSLEHRE Part 11I (1963), reprinted in H. Heller, The
Nature and Structure of the State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV 1139, 1139-1215 (David
Dyzenhaus trans., 1996).
103 Id at 1191. A post-modernist might argue along strikingly similar lines
that actors give meaning to the text in enacting it, and therefore are themselves
authors of the law.
104 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans.
1978) (1922).
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only that, but the terms of the contract would very likely reflect pre-
existing social or economic relationships in society. 5 Thus in reality,
the authors of the law would not be the individual contractors so much
as the system of social relationships in which they operated-in effect
civil society in many cases.
Karl Llewellyn and others extended this insight by arguing that
judges and legislators should adjudicate and legislate based on
empirical information about the social practices to which the law
applies. A commercial code, for example, should be based on the
practice and context of real-world commercial transactions, rather
than on abstract principles. The same would be true of laws governing
non profit organizations such as unions, religious organizations, and
so on-thus allowing civil society to "author" general rules of law. In
addition, particular legal documents should be interpreted in terms of
the "usage in trade" providing the context for the transaction to which
they apply, which the parties could be presumed to have presupposed
in their bargaining." 6 In sum, continental and Anglo-American legal
scholars laid strong conceptual foundations for a revitalized
understanding of civil society's role of in law making during the first
half of the 2 0 th century.
One might expect that the rapid growth of the empirical social
sciences in the second half of the 20th century would stimulate much
further progress in clarifying the relationship between civil society and
law. That does not seem to have been the case, however. Although the
reasons go well beyond the scope of this paper, two are relevant to this
analysis. First, most members of what came to be called the "law and
society movement" have been unwilling to focus on defining which
social phenomena count as law and which do not. This posture seems
to reflect a sense that pursuing such a question is likely to lead into an
infinite regress of formalist jurisprudential arguments that simply
recapitulate their premises. Moreover, many law and society scholars
105 Robert Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV.
451,451-72 (1920).
106 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960).
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seem to have assumed that what counts as law is an empirical
question, although this assumption is conceptually problematic and
accepted methods for addressing it have never been developed.
Second, law and society researchers have typically drawn upon
established social science disciplines and sought to explain legal
phenomena in terms of variables central to those disciplines. To a
great extent this has meant viewing the work of courts, administrative
agencies, and legislatures as products of economic interests, political
power, social class, cognitive assumptions, and the like. Efforts to
bring these variables together in a "legal system" conception might
well have included a component with civil society as a law-maker, but
by and large they have not. 7 Law and society scholars nudged toward
that possibility by developing the concepts of formal and informal
legal systems 1S and law-in-the-books versus law-in-action. '09 But they
pulled back from the potential implications of these ideas with regard
to modem societies. On one hand, informal law making was seen
largely as a phenomenon of "traditional" rather than "modem"
societies, and often as a matter of "normative," rather than truly legal
ordering. Thus it is not surprising that today a separate "law and
norms" movement has emerged, which blithely assumes that norms
are distinct from law, and then expresses collective wonder at the
importance of norms in ordering social life.o
Law-in-action studies, on the other hand, have concentrated
almost entirely on the way law is made and applied by governmental
bodies. Thus, law and society scholars have focused on the outputs of
national and local governments, judges and legislators. Whether the
research is on disputing, the legal profession, legal agencies, or even
107 E.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE chs. I & 6 (1978).
108 E.g., Richard D. Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development of Legal
Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli Settlements, 63 YALE L. J. 471, 471-91
(1954).
109 Richard Abel, Law in the Books and Books about Law, 26 STAN. L. REV.
175, 175-228 (1973).
110 E.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
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legal theory, most research seen as central to the field".. has as its
endpoint and taken-for-granted analytical filter government legal
institutions, thus neglecting the potential law making operations of
civil society institutions.
Still, there exist several strands of socio-legal research that
have focused to some extent on civil society relationships. Perhaps the
best known is research on how people understand and incorporate (or
ignore) law in their everyday lives.'12 For the most part, however,
work in this tradition has not critiqued the assumption that law is
made up of the rules and acts of the governmental agencies. Rather,
it has focused on the distance between government and civil society,
and the nature of interactions between them.
A second school of thought has explicitly rejected the
assumption that law is necessarily associated with government
agencies, and sought instead to bring into the ambit of law the full set
of social institutions that define and enforce social rights and duties.
In his study of industrial relations, for example, Philip Selznick," 3
built on the post-realist work of Lon Fuller" 4 and H.L.A. Hart" 5 to
describe important law making processes in non-governmental
organizations such as arbitration associations and universities. While
widely admired, however, this and related work"6 seems to have had
little effective impact on the state-centric understanding of law held
II See generally Frank Munger, Mapping Law and Society, in CROSSING
BOUNDARIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY
RESEARCH (1997).
112 E.g., CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE
AMERICAN TOWNS (1994); LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Keams eds., 1993).
113 PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969).
114 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
115 H.L.A. Hart, Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules, in THE
CONCEPT OF LAW Ch. V (1964).
116 E.g., Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering,
and Indigenous Law, 19 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1-47 (1981).
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by most empirical researchers, legal scholars and practitioners. ,7 The
same seems to be true of "legal system" approaches developed in the
past few decades by German theorists such as Luhmann"' and
Teubner." 9 Although they have sought to locate the essence of law in
the capacity of social institutions to declare certain types of acts
acceptable or unacceptable, their impacts on scholarship and practice
to date appear to be very limited. 2 ' It is possible, however, that the
currently marginal schools of thought represented by Selznick and
Luhmann will receive a strong push toward the center of legal
scholarship by the recent and rapid development of global law making
institutions that are not reducible to government agencies.
Global
With the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the global legal arena
officially became the "inter-national" legal arena-meaning that it
was constituted solely by, for, and of nation states. Enacting a vision
worked out by Hugo Grotius"'2 and others in the preceding decades,
117 Ironically, one of the major studies of non-governmental regulation, Ross
E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION INTHE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS (1990) (originally prepared as a Berkeley doctoral dissertation, does not
build on Selznick's insights).
118 NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Martin Albrow
ed., Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans. 1985); Klaus A. Ziegert, The Thick
Description of Law: An Introduction to Niklas Luhmann's Theory of Operatively
Closed Systems, in LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY (Max Travers & Reza Banakar, eds.,
forthcoming).
119 Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and
Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 149-67 (1997).
120 For an early effort to apply the perspective of Luhmann and Teubner to
forest certification,.see James Lawson & Benjamin Cashore, Reasearch Note: The
Application of the Theory of Social Autopoiesis to the Problem of Non-State
Sanctioned, Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance, (n.d.) (on file with author). For
a particularly clear and careful exposition of Luhmannian legal theory, see Ziegert,
supra note 118.
121 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Francis Kelsey, with
Arthur Boak trans., 1925) (1625).
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the nation states constituted themselves as independent, equal, and
exclusive legal actors in the international arena. Each was free to
make laws governing its citizens, lands, and other assets. Any law
applicable across or beyond the jurisdictions of nation states had to be
made by the nation states affected, either by treaty or by some other
mutually recognized process. Any law imposing an obligation on a
state had to rest on a formal expression of consent by that state.'
The Westphalian legal system has long been under pressure for
reasons too numerous to discuss here. The factors driving globaliza-
tion described above are among the most important. International
trade in particular has created huge challenges for state-based
conceptions of law. The drive to simplify and promote trade has been
an important factor in the rise of the European community, and its
establishment of institutions that are not explicable merely as
agreements among states.1
23
International trade also has driven the growth of legal
institutions more self-consciously distinct from states. Since an
interstate transaction crosses jurisdictions, it could conceivably be
governed by the law of either jurisdiction, and international traders
have gone to enormous lengths to attempt to choose the law applicable
to their transactions. In general, each trader is likely to have an
aversion to submitting to the legal system of the other trader. It did not
take traders long to realize that there might be advantages in being
governed by law from still other jurisdictions, or even in making their
own law and using arbitrators to enforce it, and they took steps to do
both. Gradually a distinctive set of rules and institutions for dealing
with transnational commercial transactions has arisen-lex
mercatoria, the "law merchant."
Although a tremendous amount of ink has been spilled debating
the status and content of lex mercatoria, the present discussion can be
limited to two basic points. First, a large number of problems regarding
122 Falk, supra note 72, at 337.
123 E.g., Christian Joerges, Deliberative Supranationalism-a Defense (Nov.
30-Dec. 1, 2001) (background paper for the Conference on Constitutionalism and
Transnational Governance, Florence).
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international commercial transactions are in fact settled through the lex
mercatoria system. 24 Second, the system is not reducible to the law of
states or to laws made by combinations of states. This is so even though
many state legal systems are committed by treaty to enforce the
judgments of non-state lex mercatoria arbitration panels.' 25 The obvious
next question is whether lex mercatoria should be treated as law or as
something else. This is a question which I may yet write about in detail,
but not here. For now it suffices to say that the benefits of holding off
with thinking about phenomena such as lex mercatoria as law until all
of the traditional elements (e.g., a widely recognized coercive
mechanism) are clearly present are far outweighed by the costs. To hold
back, or to argue about definitions, is to forego the opportunity to carry
out research and analysis on non-governmental law making while it is
happening-a high cost indeed. Moreover, it is to deprive civil society
institution building processes such as forest certification of the full
experience and scrutiny of legal and socio-legal research, a problem
regardless of whether one is a supporter or a critic.126 For now,
therefore, I think it appropriate to treat Teubner's bold statement as
probably accurate and work form that basis.
[G~lobalization of law creates a multitude of de-centered law-
making processes in various sectors of civil society, indepen-
dently of nation-states. Technical standardization, professional
rule production, human rights, intra-organizational regulation in
multinational enterprises, contracting, arbitration and other
institutions of lex mercatoria are forms of rule making by
124 E.g., Y. DEZALAY & B.G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (1996).
125 Under the New York Convention of 1958 over 120 countries have
committed to enforce arbitral awards where such awards are based on written
contracts to subject commercial disputes to arbitration and to abide by the
decisions. Philip J. McConaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in International
Contracts and lts Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 611 (2001).
126 Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations
and the 'Unregulated'Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 957-69 (1996).
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'private govermments' which have appeared on a massive global
scale. They claim worldwide validity independently of the law of
nation-states and in relative distance to the rules of international
public law. They have come into existence not by formal acts of
nation-states but by strange paradoxical acts of self-validation.'27
Basic Conceptual Perspectives
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to note that there seem to
be two basic approaches to the decision to treat lex mercatoria and
other forms of non-governmental regulation as law, which can be
characterized loosely as internal and external. Internal perspectives
focus on the nature of the system that produces the phenomenon at
issue. There are several variants. One focuses on the institutions
involved in the system. The traditional legal positivist perspective, for
example, generally requires that for law to exist an agency of a nation
state must formulate an order that it is prepared to enforce with
coercion.'28 The focus on the nation state is limited to a particular
historical period, however, and there is no good reason to believe that
law did not exist prior to the nation state. Thus, there is no inherent
reason the list of relevant institutional sources cannot be enlarged.
One could conceivably include some or many of the "civil society"
organizations described above in the legal system.
A second variant of the internalist perspective focuses on
characteristic functioning and products of the system. This is the
strategy of Luhmann"2 9 and Teubner,3 ° which focuses on social
communication processes that produce "binary coding"--e.g, legal/
illegal. Since the judgment could as well be sustainable/unsustainable,
it seems plausible to treat forest certification as a form of law making.
The only limitation in principle is the occasional timidity of the
127 Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World
Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (1997).
128 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
(Humanities Press 1965) (1832).
129 LUHMANN, supra note 118; Ziegert, supra note 118.
130 Tuebner, supra note 119.
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certification systems in holding back from using strong and definite
labels.
The externalist approach to defining law looks at how it is
received and used in the larger society. This is the approach suggested
by Weber's concept of legitimacy. Falk and Strauss build upon it by
emphasizing a public expectation that people will conform to a rule,
and the "pull toward compliance" exerted by the rule. '' It is the force
of public justice referred to by Professors Mohawk and Lyons in the
mid-1980s discussion described above. Legitimacy is a difficult
criterion to apply in practice, since different people could disagree on
whether such an expectation of and pull toward compliance exist in
a particular cases, but it refers to a very important aspect of law which
it would be hard to justify ignoring, as is discussed further in the
concluding section of this paper.
A second externalist strategy is to look at how society uses
organizations in a given social field to make and enforce rules. This
is the method used by Dezalay and Garth in their study of the growth
of an arbitration system for resolving transnational commercial
disputes.132 Their distinctive contribution is to describe in detail how
transnational enterprises use dispute resolution services and how
potential arbitrators and arbitration alliances build institutions to
compete for business in the field. In the course of that competition
they shape the overall transnational commercial arbitration system in
ways that suit their interests and those of the commercial transactions
system. It seems likely that a similar approach could be used to
describe the field of forest certification, wherein programs compete
for influence and legitimacy, and in the course of that competition
131 Falk & Strauss, supra note 44, at 207 following the argument sketched out
in THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
132 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 124; Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth,
Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice
from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, 29 L. & SOC'y REV.
27, 27-54 (1995). Examples of other scholars following this general approach
include Spiro, supra note 126, PAUL WAPNER, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND
WORLD CIVIC POLITICS (1996), and JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
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shape the overall law and policy of forest certification.1
33
In sum, if one takes the criteria discussed above-institutional
rule-making and adjudication mechanisms, public legitimacy, and
social usage-there is a good, although not incontrovertible case for
treating forest certification as a form of law making, specifically of
environmental law making. The next question is what this choice
gains us. Before addressing it a brief overview of environmental law
will be helpful.
Environmental Law and Civil Society
Domestic
If forest certification is a kind of law making, it is probably a
kind of environmental law making. To see how it fits and potentially
changes the structure of environmental law, it is necessary to have a
working overview of the field. Although I cannot possibly survey
environmental law around the globe, this section begins by providing
an overview of environmental law development in the Anglo-
American system.
Environmental law can be generally defined as the law
governing the relationships of humans to the biophysical environ-
ment.134 As with law in general, environmental law can be helpfully
conceptualized in terms of three basic forms or phases. At the same
133 The key here is that the competition is not limited to a competition for
business, but is also a competition to establish a legal order that will support that
business. At the same time, contrary to the way many economists and some
institutionalists conceive law, the legal order is not really fixed, but rather dynamic
and subject to constant competition. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 124, at 16.
134 There are risks to such a broad definition, primarily of taking in such a
huge and unwieldy area that it resists meaningful conceptualization. The recent
histories of the subfields, however, indicate a need to deal with interconnections
among them. Protecting an endangered arctic species, for example, may require
controlling land use in North America as well as the use of organic pesticides in the
tropics. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that a narrower definition of the field would
fruitful in either the near or the long term.
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time, it is important to understand that the phases are not completely
distinct, and that elements of each phase can be found in the others.1
35
Phase 1
Before the 19th century, most environmental law appears to
have been made in civil society. It typically took the form of either
generally accepted customs or rules developed by assemblies of
appropriate estate holders or other interested members of society.
There is little published research on this phase of environmental law,
most likely because many scholars uncritically think of environmental
law as a product of the 19th century, when the control of industrial
discharges came to be widely seen as necessary. My exploratory
review of early English legal history, however, has found a great deal
of environmental regulation in the medieval period. Typical laws
covered how many sheep and cattle could be grazed, where and when,
how water runoff must be managed, how land fertility was to be
preserved, and so on.
The details of these regulations and how they were worked out
are well beyond the scope of this paper, but it is helpful to describe a
few typical institutional practices. First, although environmental laws
usually were not voted upon nor based upon a principle of political
equality, they were generally discussed quite thoroughly in village,
town, or manorial assemblies. Most interested farmers and villagers
probably had a 'voice' and would be heard in those assemblies. At the
same time, the views of certain 'men of substance' (not necessarily
free holders) generally counted most, and the resulting bylaws tended
to reflect the interests of the better off community members.'36 It is
also apparent that in most cases regulations were not simply dictated
or imposed by officials. Whether or not the lord of the manor could in
principle set the rules under which the manor and village operated, it
135 E.g., David Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27
U.C.D.L.R..619, 619-712 (1994).
136 WARREN 0. AULT, OPEN-FIELD HUSBANDRY AND THE VILLAGE
COMMUNITY: A STUDY OFAGRARIAN BY-LAWS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 42(1965).
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is clear that he did not do so for most natural resource and
environmental regulations. These were more typically worked out by
concerned groups of citizens and then sometimes ratified by the lord.
Depending on the village of origin environmental laws might be
described as ordained "by the whole homage and by the freemen", "by
the whole township", "by the community of the town", "by the lord
and the community of the town", "by the whole homage of the town",
"by the lord and his tenants", "by all the tenants, free and customary",
or "by the assent of all the homage".'37
Over time, the rules and policies thus worked out in customary
social institutions were gradually incorporated into definitions of
property rights, primarily through real property, servitude,'38 and
nuisance doctrines. This was done first by local courts and eventually
by the royal courts and other agents of the crown, thus mirroring the
general processes for incorporating guild-made rules into
governmental law discussed above. As the origins of the property
based environmental regulations receded into history, they may have
begun to appear as if they had been created and imposed by the state
in the first place.
At the same time, however, the conflicts created by rapid
urbanization and industrialization in the late 18th and throughout the
I 91h century created new conflicts that were difficult to handle in terms
of received property rights. In trying to resolve them courts
increasingly asked whether contested land uses were 'nuisances.'
Traditional nuisance doctrine typically asked whether a
specific resource use fit or was appropriate in a given place, thus again
implicitly ratifying received civil society arrangements. But the static
and yet somewhat unpredictable implications of such an approach
brought increasing pressures on the courts to rationalize and
universalize their decisions. Thus courts came to define the central
question as whether a land use was "unreasonable" under the
137 ld. at41.
138 The term "servitude" is used here to include uses and constraints on
property use that often are separately categorized as easements, covenants, and
equitable servitudes in Anglo-American law.
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circumstances. This question invited judges to determine the proper
use of land in a changing society, and perhaps even to balance the
relative costs and benefits of alternative land uses.
At the same time, such questions were being taken up by
legislative bodies, and sometimes by newly established administrative
agencies as well, thus inaugurating institutional structures charac-
teristic of Phase 2.
Phase 2
Although the "modem" era of environmental law often is
portrayed as starting in the late 1960s or early 1970s, its institutional
roots go back a hundred years earlier. By the end of the 19" century,
legislatures and administrative agencies were beginning to address
environmental issues, promulgating a miscellany of laws directed at
air and water pollution, as well as wildlife and forest destruction, and
typically assigning their enforcement to administrative agencies
attributed with expertise in handling such problems.'39 In some
countries this was done primarily at the local or provincial level, in
others at the national level.14 ' On the whole, these laws appear to have
been relatively ineffectual for a half century or more, due primarily to
weak scientific foundations, relentless industrialization, and lacka-
daisical enforcement reflecting preferences in most jurisdictions for
economic growth over environmental protection.' 4' After World War
139 There were striking and important precedents, of course. In England, for
example, a 1388 Parliamentary statute forbade the deposit of "Dung and Filth of
the Garbage and Intrails as well as of Beasts killed, as of other Corruptions ... in
Ditches, Rivers, and other Waters," and required anyone who had made such
deposits to remove them or be fined. It also provided for citizen enforcement of the
law. Statute of 12 Rich. II. Ch.13 (1388).
j40 Formally, the level made little difference because local and provincial
governments by this time were defined as creatures of the state. J.F. DILLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§237-39 (5th ed.
1911).
141 E.g., JAN LAITOS, A LEGAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AIR POLLUTION
CONTROLS (1980).
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11 the situation slowly began to change, as the impacts of industrial
pollution became more widespread and better understood. 142
By the 1970s and 1980s most industrialized countries had
established extensive statutory and administrative systems to protect
air, water, land, and biodiversity. The systems are so extensive, and
grow so steadily, that they are extremely difficult to understand or
conceptualize. They range across an enormous array of subjects,
running from nuclear power to endangered species, from historic
preservation to genetically modified organisms, and so on. 43 They
typically involve great technological and scientific complexity, and
face enormous uncertainty. They almost always encounter unantici-
pated interconnections and problems. Finally, they often involve
difficult normative choices that can trigger or exacerbate social
conflict. In sum, they require combining sophisticated political
processes with sophisticated scientific ones. Not surprisingly, the
challenges of making and revising environmental law can be
staggering.
The complex of institutional methods primarily relied upon by
government legal systems to meet these challenges in Phase 2 is often
derisively and somewhat unfairly called "command-and-control"
regulation. Because this form of environmental law has been so
exhaustively studied and described as to be generally familiar to most
readers, I will only note its most basic institutional characteristics
here.
The core regulatory mechanism of Phase 2 environmental law
is the requirement that categories of polluters and other natural
resource users keep their environmental impacts at levels which would
result from application of the strictest feasible technological methods
to their production processes. Thus, although they usually do not
142 E.g., ERIC ASHBY & MARY ANDERSON, THE POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR
(1981).
143 E.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies:
Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in
Which Everything is Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359,
359-92 (1999).
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require the actual use of a specific technology, these requirements are
typically referred to by names such as "best available control
technology" and "best management practices."
The standards are generally defined by administrative agencies
for specific industries through rule-making and adjudication
processes. They often are set with little regard to collateral environ-
mental issues, such as waste production or consumption of scarce
resources. Pre-existing plants and activities generally are treated more
leniently than proposed ones. Actual implementation of standards
varies considerably among jurisdictions, both within and among
countries. The costs and levels of protection thus also vary among
both firms and sectors. Like any important institutional synthesis,
Phase 2 has given rise to a set of institutional antitheses in Phase 3.
Phase 3
Phase 3 consists of a number of loosely related reform
initiatives, including market mechanisms, information disclosure
requirements, flexible permitting programs, regulatory negotiation,
ecosystem management, place-based collaborative management
initiatives, voluntary agreements, good neighbor agreements, and
environmental certification programs. Many grow out of critiques of
Phase 2 regulation, although some go back farther. Overlaid on Phase
2 regulation, the overall picture constituted by these initiatives
suggests that environmental law is in considerable flux, and may be
quite hospitable to the emergence of civil society regulatory initiatives
such as forest certification.
Market Mechanisms effectively attach prices to environ-
mentally damaging activities and allow firms to reduce the damage if
doing so is cost-effective, or to pay others or pay taxes if the costs of
reduction are higher than the payments or taxes. Market mechanisms
are a response to the most influential critique of traditional regulation,
which holds that it is needlessly inefficient, costing more than
necessary to achieve a given level of social benefits. This is because
control technology standards are based on feasibility for general
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categories of polluters, rather than on individually tailored cost-benefit
criteria. Thus, one firm or sector can be required to incur significantly
higher costs than another would to obtain any given level social
benefits. ' Market mechanisms seek to obtain environmental benefits
where they are least costly, and thus to minimize the total costs to
society of environmental protection.
Two other important initiatives also respond in large part to
this critique. The first is to document means-ends, or cause-effect
relationships between regulatory strategies and environmental goals.
This of course requires a significant expansion in the quality of
scientific information and models. A second and related initiative is
to undertake comparative risk assessment of environmental regulation,
so that resources and costs will be focused on the most risky activities.
This is a very difficult undertaking making huge demands on science.
The available scientific information and models are flexible enough
that huge disagreements persist about the comparative risks of various
activities.
Although the practical role of market mechanisms remains
limited, it has been expanding for over two decades. At the formal
level, agencies have developed a number of programs, such as the
"offsetting", "bubbling" and acid rain trading programs in United
States air pollution regulation. At the informal level, too, regulatory
officials appear to allow a certain amount of "bubbling" in individual
pollution permits, even when statutes and rules do not provide for it.
Market mechanisms are regularly extended into new regulatory
territory. The State of California, for example, recently established an
"endangered species mitigation bank," whereby landowners can earn
"conservation credits" by taking steps to permanently protect
endangered species on one site and can then sell their credits to
144 On the benefit side, the argument was also made that uniform standards
among jurisdictions are undesirable, because the benefits will vary greatly
depending on population density, concentration of pollution sources, natural
conditions, and so on. JAMES KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY:
A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE
AIR POLLUTION, 1940-975 (1977).
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developers seeking to carry out projects that might harm those species
on other sites."'
Information Disclosure Requirements also appear to be
expanding steadily in environmental law. The basic strategy is to
require firms that handle dangerous substances or engage in other
potentially harmful activities to publicly disclose those activities. The
paradigmatic example is the United States "Community Right to
Know" law, which requires that anyone who stores or discharges more
than set amounts of any of a list of approximately 600 toxic chemicals
to the air, land, or water must publicly disclose the types and amounts
of chemicals involved. This must be done regardless of whether the
activities are legal or illegal, regulated or unregulated. Since its
passage in 1987, the law appears to have had a large effect on the
discharge of hazardous chemicals, possibly reducing them by over
one-third. 14 6 This kind of "transparency" strategy is not cost-free, but
is significantly less costly than traditional regulatory standard setting.
Some scholars view the emergence of information disclosure
requirements as a major step toward "reflexive" environmental law
designed to make actors reflect upon the consequences of their acts
and adjust to make them socially acceptable.' Others find them to
constitute a major expansion in the ability of wider communities to
145 Michael J. Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer, Mitigation Banking as an Endangered
Species Conservation Tool, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10537, 10537-551 (2000).
146 E.g., Bradley C. Karkainnen, Information as Environmental Regulation:
TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO.
L.J. 257, 257-370 (2001); Toxic Release Inventory: Community Right-To-Know,
at http://epa.gov./tri/tridata/tri99/press/backgrd factors.pdf. Mazurek suggests,
however, that some of these effects may be artifacts of tendencies by transnational
companies to relocate polluting activities to jurisdictions lacking comparable
disclosure laws or to outsource them to small companies that fall beneath threshold
reporting requirements. JAN MAZUREK, MAKING MICROCHIPS: POLICY,
GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUSTRY (1999).
147 E.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REv.
1227, 1227-339 (1995).
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monitor and set benchmarks for the performance of corporations.'48
State imposed disclosure requirements can thus be seen as valuable
resources for civil society regulatory institutions.
Flexible Permitting Programs allow firms to avoid specific
regulatory requirements in return for showing that they can provide
equal or greater environmental benefits by other, presumably less
costly means. Flexible permitting programs respond to some of the
same critiques of command-and-control regulation as market
mechanisms, but give the regulatory agency a more direct role in the
decisional processes. Examples include "Project XL" in the United
States and the Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme ("EMAS")'49
in the European Union. Rather than simply creating legally protected
interests that can be traded, the government agency creates a
framework in which firm are invited to be innovative to the benefit of
the public, subject to some sort of check and ratification by the
administrative agency.
The record of flexible permitting processes is unclear at this
stage. In the U.S., flexible permitting seems to have fallen short of
expectations, creating just about as many procedural hurdles and
business costs as it eliminated 5' and stimulating relatively little
environmental improvement. Recently, however, the EPA has
established a new, ostensibly improved program called Performance
Track, which relies more heavily on environmental management
148 E.g., Karkkainen, supra note 146. At the same time, it is important to note
that modem environmental systems still face severe and possibly increasing
information disparities. Thus while it is true that the amount of public information
seems to be growing absolutely in most industrial societies, the amount of private
information, much of it given proprietary protection, may be growing even more
quickly.
149 EEC Council Regulation 1836/93 (authorizing voluntary participation by
industrial firms in a community eco-management and audit scheme) 1993 0.1. (L
168) 1. The primary benefits of EMAS participation for companies appear to be
extended time frames for regulatory compliance and reduced penalties for non-
compliance.
1.50 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Nat'l Envtl. Performance Track
at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack.
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systems and non-governmental environmental certification programs
such as ISO 14001.51 EMAS, which also includes a substantial EMS
component, 152 seems to be viewed as more of a success in Europe,
although it too has fallen short of expectations. Nonetheless, these
programs persist and seem to be growing, as agencies work to
improve them in successive iterations.
Regulatory Negotiation ("reg-neg") is a rule-making process
in which a government regulatory agency organizes a stakeholder
group and commissions it to draft a proposed rule addressing a
specific problem. The stakeholder group is supposed to represent all
important affected groups, to be willing to bargain in good faith, and
to seek consensus. Agencies are advised to use this method for
problems that are not likely to be highly contentious, nor require
participants to compromise their fundamental commitments. 53 When
the regulatory negotiation process is complete the agency subjects the
proposed rule to a slightly streamlined version of its traditional rule
making processes, but remains responsible for the ultimate content of
the rule.
Reg-Neg processes have been used in a large number of
environmental rule-makings since the mid-1980s, although
impressionistic evidence suggests that their popularity in the United
11 Id.
152 Each company participating in the EMAS program prepares an
environmental management system incorporating several principles, including
pollution prevention and source reduction. The environmental management system
must include: (a) specific definitions of mahagement responsibilities in the
company for environment matters; (b) a register summarizing the effects that the
company's operations on the environment; (c) environmental record keeping and
reporting procedures; (d) a public environmental statement listing significant
environmental issues and emissions; and (e) periodic audits of the company's
management system, with verification of the audits by an external auditor.
Participating companies have the right to register with their national governments
and to be included in a list of EMAS companies published in the Official Journal
of the European Union. The companies are also permitted to advertise publicly
their participation in the program. Id.
153 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: NEGOTIATED
RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK at 37-41(1990).
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States may have leveled off recently. Evaluations of the process are
contentious. Some commentators argue that reg-neg has provided for
a forum in which regulatory problems are effectively redefined,
innovative solutions found, and new institutions developed.154 Others
assert that they have not reduced regulatory costs, conflict, or
litigation,155 and have dangerously transferred regulatory power to
private interests, a form of "capture".'56
Ecosystem Management seeks to integrate the many
environmental and social interconnections implicated in all significant
environmental management decisions. Its goal is to correct for the
shortcomings of single-purpose and single-technique environmental
actors, both private and public. Ecosystem management attempts to do
this by locating all significant actors and their activities in a broad
scale ecological framework and addressing the complex ecological
and social interactions among them. Often it also seeks to link
"environmental" issues to social and economic ones such as
community maintenance and job creation, thus partaking in the post-
Rio 'sustainable development' framework. In doing so, most
ecosystem management initiatives attempt to combine a comprehen-
sive analytical methodology with broad stakeholder collaboration. An
important driver of ecosystem management is the recognition that the
fragmentation of jurisdiction over the natural environment among
many governments and property holders leaves none of them in a
position to achieve integrated management on its own. Integrated,
ongoing stakeholder collaboration is necessary to make, assess, and
revise environmental policy.'
154 Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1, 1-98 (1997).
155 Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J 255, 255-1349 (1997).
156 William Funk, Bargaining Toward a New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L. J. 1351, 1351-
388 (1997).
157 Errol Meidinger, Legal and Institutional Challenges of Ecosystem
Management, in CREATING A FORESTRY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY: THE SCIENCE
OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (Kathryn A. Kohm & Jerry F. Franklin eds., 1997),
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Ecosystem management has been a "top-down" strategy on the
whole, conceived primarily by ecologists and centralized government
agencies and NGOs. At the same time, governments and government
agencies are often only one or two members of the broader group of
stakeholders, although they sometimes play a controlling role. To
date, the legal framework for ecosystem management appears to
consist primarily of memoranda of understanding among units of
government and contractual agreements among government agencies
and landholders. Ecosystem management proponents in the United
States have generally not sought amendments or new authority in
statutes,' evidently out of a fear of "opening up" environmental
statutes to the risk of weakening amendments.
Place-Based Collaborative Management Initiatives are closely
related to ecosystem management ones, but have typically been more
bottom-up, self-organized processes. They are often established on a
"watershed" basis, on the underlying theory that actors in a watershed
are mutually dependent upon each other, and would be well advised
to work out mutually acceptable understandings of proper environ-
mental management. The watershed frame also provides a basis for
deciding who the participants should be.The specific focci of place-
based groups vary with the environmental management issues relevant
to the particular place. They often involve water quality, fisheries, and
forest management, although the scope of issues can expand beyond
.traditional environmental ones to include social and economic ones,
The United States EPA estimates that there are currently over 3000
local watershed management groups in the United States.'59
Some place-based groups have evolved very definite structures
of rights and responsibilities, enforceable through legal or informal
available at http://www.law.buffalo.edu/homepage/eemneid/scholarship/
orglegchal.htm.
158 INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, THE ECOSYSTEM
APPROACH: HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES (1995).
159 Christine Lewicki, Governing by Watersheds-A National Trend,
Address to the Conference on Learning Sustainability (Oct. 10-13, 2001).
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sanctions 6 ' whereas others have much looser, more fluid
arrangements in which members come and go. 1 ' Again, government
bodies sometimes participate in place-based management initiatives,
but generally more as stakeholders than as sovereigns. In recent years
governments seem increasingly inclined to take steps to facilitate
place based management processes, thus giving them some "top-
down" impetus as well. In the US, for example, the EPA has
encouraged states to set up watershed management groups to set and
allocate "total maximum daily loads" of pollution for particular
watersheds under the CWA.'62
Voluntary Agreements typically are "one-shot" deals
negotiated between government agencies and firms in which the firms
commit to improving their environmental performance beyond what
is required under existing law. They differ from flexible permits in
that there is no pre-defined framework in which they are worked out,
and they are therefore difficult to incorporate systematically in
environmental law.'63 Voluntary agreements are extremely common
in Japan, and quite common in some European countries.164 They can
be negotiated at the national, regional, or local level. Although local
governments seem particularly vulnerable to informational and
negotiating inequalities in relation to firms, there are good arguments
that voluntary agreements allow governments to achieve higher levels
160 E.g., EVELYN PINKERTON & MARTIN WEINSTEIN, FISHERIES THAT WORK:
SUSTAINABILITY THROUGH COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGEMENT (1995).
161 For a description and critical analysis of the Applegate Partnership, see
Stephen M. Nickelsberg, Note: Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of
Community-Based Environmental Protection, 84 VA. L. REV. 1371, 1371-409
(1998), which is one of the best known and most influential of the American place-
based collaborative management initiatives.
162 OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW,
POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999).
163 Dietrich Murswiek, Das sogennannte Kooperationsprinzip-ein Prinzip
des Umweltschutzes, 12 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UMWELTRECHT 7, 7-13 (2001).
164 CARLO CARRARO & FRANCOIS LEVEQUE, VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1999).
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of environmental protection than they otherwise would. 6 '
"Good Neighbor Agreements" are somewhat like traditional
voluntary agreements, but are negotiated between firms and
community groups or other civil society organizations, rather than
between firms and governments.'66 It is impossible to say how many
exist, but they seem to be multiplying rapidly, facilitated to some
extent by the public information, participation, and review require-
ments of government regulatory programs. Good neighbor agreements
often are very sophisticated arrangements, approximating or
exceeding the detail and coverage of permit documents prepared by
regulatory agencies.'67 They generally seek to achieve environmental
performance superior to that government agencies are able to require,
and largely cut government out of the deal, leaving it only as a
background player. Contract law and private land use agreements
often are used to help assure compliance.
Environmental Certification Programs provide frameworks in
which firms can be certified as practicing good environmental
management. Some, such as the chemical industry's "Responsible
Care" program"' and the United States forest product industry's
Sustainable Forestry Initiative, are run by industry trade associations.
Others, such as the ISO 14001 program, are run by inter-sectoral
industry-based groups, some of which are government sanctioned.
Still others, such as the Forest Stewardship Council, are established
by NGO-based groups. Depending on the program, firms are entitled
to signal their certification status by displaying labels on their
literature, facilities, or products. ISO-type programs focus on the
implementation of sophisticated environmental management systems
165 Rehbinder, supra note 79; Id.
166 R. Nils Olsen Jr., The Concentration of Commercial Hazardous Waste
Facilities in the WNY Community, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 473, 473-522 (1991).
167 E.g., Stillwater Mine, Good Neighbor Agreement between Stillwater
Mining Company and Northern Plain Resources Council and Others (2000), at
http://www.nprcmt.org/Good%20Neighbor/20Agreement-complete.htm.
168 Neil Gunningham, Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical
Industry: Assessing Responsible Care, 17 LAW & POL'Y 57, 57-109 (1995).
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("EMS"s) by firms,'69 while FSC-type programs focus on performance
requirements. The performance requirements almost always include
traditional pollution and biodiversity concerns, but some are now
extending to include economic, community, and labor ones as well.
Taken together, the above-described initiatives indicate great
churning in the field of environmental law. Most of them expand the
role of civil society organizations in domestic environmental law. For
the most part, civil society institutions do not seem to displace
government ones, but rather enter open-ended cooperative and
partnership relationships with them. 70 Government agencies generally
remain dominant, but rely heavily on extra-governmental processes
and relationships, and often operate in horizontal rather than vertical
relationships with them. Although it is difficult to generalize about
such a diverse set of initiatives, it seems safe to predict that they will
lead to increased incorporation of civil society norms and institutions
into governmental regulation, making it all the more important to
monitor civil society regulatory institutions. It also seems possible that
the new initiatives portend fundamentally more complex and
contentious legal processes, as the roles and responsibilities of various
governmental and non-governmental actors overlap and blur. These
problems seem especially likely if the tendency to integrate
traditionally separate economic and social concerns expands,
concomitantly expanding both the number of interested actors and the
inherent conceptual and informational challenges.
Global
Global environmental law has a history broadly similar to its
domestic counterpart, but much briefer and less accomplished. Before
World War II there was very little international environmental law, the
169 COGLIANESE & NASH, supra note 12.
170 Cf Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1-98; Meidinger, supra note 4; Stepan Wood, Voluntary
Environmental Standards: Green Revolution or Greenwash?, in SOCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS: REFOCUSING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE (forthcoming).
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primary exceptions being treaties to' protect migratory birds and a few
international water bodies. Since World War II the pace has
accelerated considerably, with a raft of treaties and cases seeking to
protect transnational environmental resources. 7' Important examples
include the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer ("Montreal Protocol") and the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"), as
well as the soon-to-be-ratified Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants ("POPs Convention").
On the whole, however, progress through the Westphalian
system of nation-state negotiations has been painfully slow, while the
growth of serious transnational environmental problems has been
remarkably rapid. Problems such as global climate change, biodiver-
sity loss, ocean degradation, decertification, drinking water degrada-
tion, and hazardous and nuclear waste mismanagement have not been
effectively addressed by the Westphalian system. Even where treaties
exist, their enforceability and adaptability to change often are subject
to serious doubt. Finally, the growing promotion of international
trade, and the distrust of regulations that could conceivably constitute
non-tariff trade barriers, create international obstacles to improved
domestic environmental regulation.
Given the limited capacity and achievements of Westphalian
institutions, it is not surprising that global civil society organizations
would attempt to fill the gap. As noted in the introduction, it was the
failure of international institutions to protect tropical forests that
spurred the growth of forest certification in the first place. For this
reason and because of the law-like nature and structure of forest
certification, it is in the ironic position of being faced with the same
questions confronting traditional legal systems.
171 KISS & SHELTON, supra note 72.
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Forest Certification as Environmental Law
This section treats forest certification as a form of environmental
law and starts to ask some of the questions regarding certification that
are asked of environmental law. Of the many possible criteria that could
be deployed and their variants, this paper focuses on four general areas:
efficacy, coherence, adaptability, and legitimacy. Its goal is more to
clarify and frame important questions than to answer them at this stage,
although some working hypotheses are offered.
Efficacy
In modem times, the criterion most frequently invoked to
evaluate legal systems is that of efficacy."' Its core question is
whether the legal system effectively governs how people interact in a
given field. In the case of environmental law, the question is whether
the legal system effectively governs human relationships to the
biophysical environment. Ironically, there has been very little research
on the overall efficacy of Phase I and Phase 2 environmental law
systems. This is in part because of the enormous difficulty, if not
impossibility, of attributing cause and effect relationships to such
large phenomena.
There is also an important and contested preliminary problem:
efficacy toward what end? Neither the traditional environmental law
system nor forest certification have come up with a clearly defined
end. Indeed, as suggested above, part of the operation of any legal
system focuses on defining the goals of the system. Environmental
law and forest certification are caught up in larger societal dialogues
on environmental policy. In the past two decades societal conceptions
of environmental regulation have begun to shift from relatively
narrow, negative conceptions of controlling pollution and other
destructive practices toward broader, more affirmative conceptions of
achieving sustainability and sustainable development. These affirma-
172 E.g., HARRY W. JONES, THE EFFICACY OF LAW (1969).
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tive conceptions include important social and economic goals, such as
economic vitality and community stability. For this reason alone they
are harder than negative goals to operationalize, and their achievement
is accordingly harder to "certify." In fact, the difficulty of
documenting sustainability prompted the Forest Stewardship Council
to redefine what its program certifies, from "sustainably" to "well"
managed forests.
Nonetheless, there has been considerable discussion about the
efficacy of forest certification, mostly focusing on how well it protects
the environment. ' The first level has debated the comparative
advantages of programs based on substantive standards versus those
based on environmental management systems. '74 The second level has
debated the comparative effects of different standards-based
systems. ' Although some of this debate is based on limited empirical
research, most of it is hypothetical-deductive in form. In other words,
it assumes that standards will be fully implemented and then compares
the assumed effects of the standards. Similarly, standards systems and
environmental management systems are compared based on analysts'
assumptions about how they will work in practice. These assumptions
often are based on a queasy mix of real-world experience and
commitment to different management philosophies and even theories
of social control.
17 This is not surprising, since there is broad agreement across legal systems
that protection of environmental resources, particularly those that are valuable to
humans, is a core goal of environmental law. Thomas Lundmark, Systematizing
EnvironmentalLaw andPolicy, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (1998). It does,
however, fall short of addressing the post-Rio environment-society-economy goals
of sustainable development.
174 E.g., Pierre Hauselmann, ISO Inside Out: ISO and Environmental
Management (1997) (WWF Int'l discussion paper, Geneva); RIVA KRUT & HARRIS
GLECKMAN, ISO 14001: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT (1998).
175 E.g., CEPI, supra note 65; MERIDIAN INSTITUTE, COMPRATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL® AND SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY
INITIATIVE® CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS (2001), at http://www.merid.org/
comparison.
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Many of the analyses that have been done are useful in that
they clarify the terms and structures of certification programs. And
despite my critical posture, it is my impression that forest certification
programs are leading to some improvements in forest management.176
Still, we know very little about why or where or under what
conditions. And debates regarding the relative merits of different
approaches probably cannot be sorted out at this point because we
lack anything remotely approximating evaluation research.
The absence of rigorous evaluation research on forest
certification is somewhat ironic, since the efficacy of certification
systems is in principle easier to research than the efficacy of more
multi-faceted legal systems. If proper evaluation research were to be
done, comparable firms would be randomly assigned either to be
certified or not. The certification group would also be randomly
assigned to different certification programs so that the programs could
be compared.177 The performance of the firms would be measured
before and after certification, ideally at regular intervals. Typical
performance of certified and non-certified firms could then be
compared by program.
Systematic evaluation research is quite unlikely to be done,
however, for two basic reasons. First, because certification programs
are self-defined as voluntary there is a significant problem with
'selection effects.' Firms choose whether or not to participate in
certification programs based on their individual assessments of what
is in their best interest. It is therefore likely that significant prior
differences exist between firms that enter certification programs and
those that do not, and between firms that enter different certification
programs or enter them at different times. Accordingly, differences in
their performance over time are as likely to be correlated with
176 See generally Meidinger, supra note 4, at 164, 199, 217.
177 See generally DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY,
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963).
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underlying differences among finns, as with differences in the
programs per se.t"'
Second, certification programs are not designed to produce
detailed, comparative data on the performance of forest enterprises.
Rather, the whole point of certification is to make a binary
classification: certified or not-certified. Firms within the certified
category are portrayed as if they were homogenous in performance.
The primary site-specific information provided by certification
programs is the label itself. The label can be matched up with the
standards and criteria on which it is based, but the standards and
criteria are general, and do not provide any further information on the
particular enterprise. If such information is to be provided, it must
come from voluntary action of the firm or compulsory mandates of
other regulators, usually governments. This situation exposes a second
level of irony: some of the attraction of certification to firms may
derive from its potential to stave off mandatory regulatory disclosure
of more detailed information on their operations.
In sum, we do not have and are not likely to get anything
approximating scientifically persuasive information on the efficacy of
forest certification programs. This does not mean, however, that we
are incapable of making efficacy assessments and recommendations.
Research on other areas of regulation suggests several areas of
concern which will have to be dealt with over time as certification
systems assess their efficacy and seek to reconfigure themselves. I
raise them here in an attempt to spur discussion as early as possible.
Given that forest certification is only one forest regulatory system
among several, it is useful to consider efficacy from both an internal
and external standpoint.
178 This is a more general version of the argument that firms seeking
certification are likely to be good performers regardless of whether they undertake
certification. E.g., Kirsti Thornber et al., Certification: Barriers to Benefits: A
Discussion of Equity Implications (1999) (European Forestry Institute Discussion
Paper No. 8).
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Internal
Viewed internally, regulatory systems can be understood
primarily as seeking to control the behavior of their direct "targets"--
typically regulated firms. We have a great deal of experience with
command and control regulation which might be useful to forest
certification. In this section I will touch on only a few issues that seem
most immediate.
Accountability.7 9 At present certification systems are built on a three
part accountability structure: policy maker/accreditor certifier forest
management organization. This is a rough approximation of the
agencyinspector regulated firm structure typical of governmental
regulation, but there are several important differences. First, many
certification systems seek to improve the compliance of organizations
by institutionalizing controls within the firm in the form of
environmental management systems. Many governmental regulatory
programs are also pursuing such strategies, but there is little
information as yet on how they work. As I have suggested above and
elsewhere, 80 it is hard to believe that environmental management
systems will have no effect on firm behavior. On the whole, they seem
likely to lead to improvements, simply because they give specific
actors in management organizations specific responsibilities for
specific issues-whereas before these elements were often highly
diffuse or absent in the management organizations. We just do not
know how much improvement there is or under what circumstances.
The second important difference is that certifiers are not
employees of the certification programs. Rather, they are hired and
paid by firms seeking to be'certified. Experience with other regulatory
programs suggests that this situation has the potential to lead to at
179 This paper focuses on internal program accountability and control. The
bigger question of democratic accountability to the public, E.g., Spiro, supra note
126, is left for a later paper.
180 Meidinger, supra note 4, at 199-203.
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least to major types of problems: limited enforcement resources and
risks of corruption.
Limited Enforcement Resources. The resources available to certifiers
to monitor compliance come from the firms being monitored, and are
fundamentally limited by the total magnitude of certification revenues.
This means it will be difficult for certifiers to concentrate resources on
monitoring firms in the way an administrative agency might, for
example, focus its resources on particular companies thought likely to
present special problems. Certifiers will generally be hard pressed to
set their fees for any particular firm higher than the costs of certifying
that firm in order to pay for surveillance of other firms. It may be
possible for certification firms to call for help with extra resources
from environmental NGOs or foundations in particularly difficult
circumstances, but it does not seem likely that they will be able to do
so on a regular or continuing basis.
Risk of Corruption. Second, there is a serious risk of what as well be
labeled corruption, despite the term's powerful overtones. By
corruption I simply mean allowing one's official judgments to be
influenced by self-interest in a way that is inconsistent with one's
official duties. Because of their need for continuing revenues,
certifiers are highly dependent on firms seeking certification and are
under pressures to satisfy them. This is particularly true of the ISO
14001 and AF&PA Sustainable Forestry Initiative programs, but also
applies to the FSC program. Certifiers have strong interests in
pleasing their employers, and are likely to be selected in part because
they are expected to sympathize with the viewpoints of their
employers.181 At the same time, of course, the reason certifiers are
181 For a critical analysis of PriceWaterhouseCoopers auditing of clothing
manufacturers, see Dara O'Rourke, Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Labor Monitoring (2000) at http://web.mit.edu/dorourke
/www/PDF/pwc.pdf. For an argument that auditors suffer from an inherent "self-
serving bias" see Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-
Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L. J. 1597, 1597-664 (2000).
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employed is to provide assurance to the public that the firms
employing them in fact are performing as advertised.
Certifiers are thus placed in an inherently difficult position,
since they are in effect public fiduciaries employed by the very private
actors whose activities they are supposed to assess and monitor. To
date, in my estimation, the public discussion and analysis of this
problem in the forest certification arena has been quite limited and
exceedingly naive. This is probably due in part to the fact that the
primary basis of reliability attributed to certifiers is professionalism,
and the discussion has taken place primarily among forestry
professionals. We know from the history of other fiduciary
professions, however, including accounting and law, that other
safeguards are important and perhaps essential.
Institutional Safeguards. At present there are very few structural
safeguards against corruption in forest certification. The primary one
in the case of the FSC is periodic auditing of certifiers' decisions by
FSC staff. Although this process recently led to the suspension of one
certifier's privileges,182 the oversight resources of the FSC are very
limited, and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The
AF&PA system evidently provides for no auditing of certifiers at all,
and indeed makes them even more dependent on firms than the FSC
system. The AF&PA has provided, however, for a rudimentary
external complaint system wherein people who believe they have
information indicating that a member company is not conforming to
SF1 guidelines can submit that information to someone who will keep
their identities confidential. This is a start toward creating a more
adequate accountability structure, but a very limited and probably
quite inadequate one, because there are likely to be few cases in which
182 The certification organization involved was SKAL, based in the
Netherlands, which was temporarily deprived of its authority to issue new
certificates. FSC headquarters circular to National Initiatives (April 9, 2001) (on
file with author). It was reinstated about a month later, after undergoing intensive
discussions and a training session. Memorandum from Karen Tam, Operations
Officer to FSC Members, (May 11, 2001) (on file with author).
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people have the necessary combination of information and adversity
to file complaints.
Research on regulatory institutions has produced a broad
consensus that triangulation of social accountability structures is
important to regulatory efficacy. The key idea is to empower third
parties to monitor the performance of both regulators and
regulatees. "3 The third parties may be organized groups, or they may
be more diffuse actors such as citizens. Many institutional mechan-
isms exist for achieving triangulation. Perhaps the most important in
environmental regulation are "citizen suit" and various "transparency"
and public information devices. A citizen suit mechanism empowers
parties aggrieved by non-compliance with a rule to bring legal
enforcement actions directly against the violator, with or without
action by the government regulator. 4 Transparency mechanisms give
aggrieved parties information with which to publicize the misbehavior
of the regulated party to the public at large, and possibly to take legal
action. The "community-right-to-know" laws discussed above are one
of the most powerful examples in modem law, but there are others.'
It is important to note that triangulation mechanisms place
increased compliance pressures not only on regulatees, but also on
regulators, whose performance can also be questioned. This creates
some structural "balance" in a situation where regulators are
responsible for protecting public interests, and is likely to improve the
efficacy of the regulators in performing their functions. Another
important factor is that the outsiders must have some leverage to
challenge the effectiveness of the system in order to enhance its
effectiveness. Typically, this means the capacity to inflict some kind
of "bad" on poorly performing parties. T hird, of course, this process
183 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
184 Barry Boyer & Errol E. Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement:
A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits under Federal Environmental Laws, 35
BUFF. L. REV. 834, 834-965 (1985).
185 Karkkainen, supra note 146.
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is likely to make forest certification more of a public phenomenon,
and less a narrowly "professional" one.
Many different triangulation structures are possible for forest
certification, and it is not feasible to propose or justify a specific one
here. Rather, the key point is that to achieve reliable efficacy (and
thereby adaptability and legitimacy) forest certification programs will
likely need to empower third parties to monitor and challenge the
performance of firms and programs.186 The third parties should be
involved not only in the policy formation process, but also in the
implementation process. Who they should be could vary among from
one cultural and institutional context to another, but it seems clear that
the issue will need to be worked out for certification to become a
dependably effective process.
"Creative Compliance." Another dimension of forest certification that
has received much thought by lawyers and some study by socio-legal
scholars, but relatively little public discussion by forest certification
experts is the problem of "creative compliance." If pressed, most
lawyers would probably acknowledge that one of their most important
roles is to help clients "work around" rules. Working around rules
does not mean violating them, but rather finding ways to conform to
them while sometimes attaining ends that the rules were probably
intended to prevent. MeBamet and Whelan provide a number of
informative case studies of how corporate lawyers have figured out
ways to get around financial regulations, often with the tacit
cooperation of accountants who enjoy institutionalized trust very
similar to that accorded forest certifiers.
187
186 In principle, it is possible that governmental agencies could play the
triangulation role in some contexts. It seems unlikely, however, that those contexts
will be ones where agencies are already heavily involved in certification, such as
in Europe, since their interests are quite closely aligned with some certification
programs, E.g., PEFC, supra note 64, and opposed to others, E.g., FSC, supra note
4.
187 Doreen McBarnet& ChristopherJ. Whelan, Creative Compliance andthe
Defeat of Legal Control: The Magic of the Orphan Subsidiary, in THE HUMAN
FACE OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOROF DONALD HARRIS 177-198 (Keith Hawkins ed.,
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Creative compliance seems to be an endemic tendency of rule-
based systems, and there is no reason to think that forest certification
systems will be free of the problem. I suspect that the main reason it
has not received much thought to date is that the designers of
certification systems are strongly inclined either to believe their rules
will work, or at least not to question them too closely. Moreover, they
may be somewhat naive about the workings of traditional
governmental regulatory programs. Eventually they will have to
confront the problem, however. They will have to engage in the same
kind of process that financial regulators are involved in, which is
trying to adjust their rules to close off the loop holes that creative
compliers have found and then watching for reports of new forms of
1997); DOREEN MCBARNET & CHRISTOPHER J. WHELAN, CREATIVE ACCOUNTING
AND THE CROSS-EYED JAVELIN THROWER(1999). The collapse of the energy
trading corporation, Enron, in late 2001, evidently due in part to creative
compliance with accounting rules approved by major accounting firm Arthur
Anderson, might be taken as an exclamation point to this warning, which was
written months before the collapse. However, the exact bearing of the Enron case
on forest certification remains to be worked out. One of the commonly cited
problems, the provision of both accounting and consulting services by Arthur
Anderson, with the consulting as lucrative as the accounting work, may have given
Anderson an added incentive to facilitate creative compliance. No evidence has
come to my attention that there is a comparable problem in the forest certification
context, although it is difficult to say with certainty. Most certification programs
appear to have bans on certifiers providing consultancy services to firms they
certify, but it is not out of the question that some of the experts retained by
certification firms may have interests of some kind in the professional advice relied
upon by certified forest enterprises. On the other hand, there is a type of
accountability pressure present in the financial accounting world that is absent from
or much weaker in the forest certification world, and that is the fact that
stockholders who might be injured by accountant ratified overestimates of a stock's
value will place considerable pressures on accountants to avoid such situations.
Gretchen Morgenson, Scandal's Ripple Effect: Earnings Under Threat, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, § 3, at i. If an accounting firm got a reputation for approving
questionable practices, its audits would lose value in the financial markets and its
business would therefore be expected to decline. There are not likely to be
comparable pressures from consumers of certified wood, although competitors
might have incentives to police one another to some extent.
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creative compliance. At present, however, as is further discussed in
the "adaptation" section below, forest certification systems seem
poorly equipped to deal with this challenge. They are not organized to
systematically collect information on creative compliance. No one in
the system has that function.
External
The fact that certification programs operate in a larger
regulatory arena, often competing and cooperating with one another
and with governments, means that they can also achieve efficacy by
influencing other programs. First, and most obviously, there is reason
to believe that more rigorous certification programs, such as the FSC,
have spurred significant improvements in less rigorous ones, such as
the SFI; 88 a moderately optimistic analysis holds that this dynamic is
likely to occur to certification programs generally.'89 Less obviously,
certification programs may also have broader external effects by
stimulating improvements in governmental environmental regulation
and promoting increased consistency among jurisdictions.
Improved Governmental Regulation. Forest certification programs
have the attention of governmental forestry agencies in most of the
world. Some government management agencies have chosen to seek
certification of the lands they manage under one program or another.
Others, particularly in Europe and Asia, have formed alliances with
specific certification programs.
Even where governments are officially detached they are likely
to be influenced in various ways by certification programs. First, as
noted above, certification programs are likely to bring public attention
to how well government agencies are doing their work, and may
possibly spur them to improve. Second, the larger discussion of
forestry standards and practices stimulated by certification processes
188 Meidinger, supra note 4.
199 Fung et al., supra note 47.
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is likely to infuse governmental legal requirements in various ways,
including changes in formal rules and informal implementation prac-
tices, as well as standards imposed by courts and other agencies. 90
In Bolivia the FSC-oriented standard setting process
undertaken by a non-profit civil society organization led not only to
the creation FSC national standards, but also to revisions of
government requirements, which ended up being effectively the same.
The government regulations also recognize FSC certified forestry
operations as complying with forest laws. 9 '
Third, government agencies could simply require certification
as a condition of conducting forestry in their jurisdictions, as some
have done already,' 92 thus significantly expanding their total
implementation capacity. There are intermediate options as well. For
example, when Guatemala makes a land concession to a community
forestry group in the Biosphere Reserve it requires the group to obtain
FSC certification within three years,'93 apparently as a condition of
retaining the concession.
Even if they do not formally require certification, government
agencies could concentrate their enforcement on uncertified firms,
treating certified ones as likely to be in compliance. Again, this would
effectively expand total enforcement resources and presumably lead
to improved overall compliance.'94 Governments could even seek to
190 See generally Meidinger, supra note 4.
191 William Cordero, Forest Certification and Law in Bolivia, Presentation
to the International Conference on Social and Political Implications of Forest
Certification (Jun. 20-22, 2001) (video on file with author).
192 Meidinger, supra note 4.
193 Andrea Finger-Stitch, Community Concessions and Certification in the
Maya Biosphere Reserve, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF FOREST
CERTIFICATION 165 (Errol E. Meidinger, Christopher Elliott and Gerhard Oesten,
eds., 2003).
194 Interestingly, the degree to which this has occurred to date is unclear. The
U.S.E.P.A. evidently has increased the resources it expends on defining and
managing the "Performance Track" program, for example, but there is little
evidence that it has shifted enforcement resources to monitoring firms that are not
in the program. COGLIANESE & NASH, supra note 12, at 231-2.
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leverage their overall resources by attempting to 'steer' certification
programs, as they are doing to a limited degree already. 95 This
strategy might be one of the ways in which states gradually redefine
their regulatory roles, increasingly incorporating civil society
regulatory programs where they can, and focusing their own efforts on
areas where certification programs are less helpful.
It should be noted however, that any obvious increased
government involvement in or reliance on certification programs is
likely to trigger back-pressure by industry on certification programs.
Thus, there might be increased pressure for lower standards and less
expensive, weaker inspection practices, as evidently has been the case
with the PEFC.
Inter-Jurisdictional Consistency. As a global movement, forest
certification automatically creates new channels of communication
and comparison across national boundaries. If in fact it has the
influence on governmental regulatory standards and practices posited
above, certification has the potential to promote increased regulatory
consistency and convergence among jurisdictions, both governmental
and non-governmental. Although this possibility is subject to the
logical challenges of coherence discussed below, it is a goal high on
the agenda of both environmental organizations and many trans-
national businesses, who see advantages to consistent rules across
jurisdictions. At present, there remains enormous variability among.
national systems and different certification systems, but the possibility
exists that together they will serve as conduits for convergence over
time.
Adaptability
Ultimately, forest certification will be efficacious only to the
extent that it promotes sustainable forest management. Promoting
195 Kernaghan Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, in VOLUNTARY
INITIATIVES: THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE GREENING 32, 33 (Robert B.
Gibson, ed., 1999).
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sustainability will not be a-simple matter of implementing existing
rules and standards. First, there is inevitably much we do not know
about how to achieve sustainability. Second, those subject to certifica-
tion programs will often practice "creative compliance." Third, rule
systems generally have unanticipated consequences as great or greater
than the intended ones.196 Therefore, such systems need to be
adaptable.
In essence the challenge of adaptability is a challenge of
learning- specifically, learning to solve emergent problems. 9 7 Forest
certification programs face major challenges regarding how to
institutionalize learning. Perhaps because they have conceptualized
themselves so much as rule systems, and because there has been so
much contention about the content of the rules, they do not seem to
have taken seriously the problem of gathering and analyzing infor-
mation about their own performance and how they can improve it.
The primary need is to create feedback loops from ground-
level experience to system-level policies. The major repositories of
ground level information, certifiers, do not seem to have incentives or
resources to share information on implementation experiences or to
gather systematic information. Indeed, since they compete with each
other, certifiers may have disincentives to share anything beyond the
trivial or obvious. Management organizations are also in competition
with each other, and would seem to have equally few incentives to
share information, particularly when it might cost them money. As
forest certification is presently constituted, no other interests have the
capacity to gather detailed information on ground level experience.
This situation could change if some of the suggestions for
transparency and triangulation made above were to be adopted. It
probably must change if forest certification is to become sufficiently
adaptive to remain viable over the long term. The fact that the
problem has not been more carefully addressed to date seems
particularly unfortunate given the potential envisioned by some
196 JONES, supra note 169.
197 LEE, supra note 89.
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observers for transnational NGOs to become agents of global social
learning. 98 If this potential is realized, it is likely to be a major
development in the capacity of global civil society to circumvent some
of the severe limitations of the Westphalian governance system.
Coherence
From the perspective of legal theory, forest certification,
particularly as exemplified by the FSC, is a stunningly ambitious
undertaking. It seeks to create a set of rules and institutions for forest
certification that (1) integrate environmental, social, and economic goals,
(2) apply them consistently across boreal, temperate and tropical forests,
in (3) developed and developing regions with vastly different institutional
arrangements and cultural traditions. One may pause simply to wonder
whether any rational actor would undertake such a profoundly difficult
task. Of course a skeptic might quickly observe that perhaps the
ambitions of forest certification are not as great as they seem. Actually,
what forest certification needs to achieve is an acceptable image of
globally consistent rules rather than the "reality"."9 This is also what
most global traders would want-a system in which the fundamental
qualities of products are not subject to question.
Regardless of whether the ambitions of forest certification are
truly staggering, or merely unprecedented, they are worth following
closely. The Westphalian system has been utterly incapable of fulfil-
ling either vision. All legal systems should therefore pay close
attention to how forest certification fares. If forest certification makes
significant progress there is much to be learned from it, both about
how to make rules and about the emergent role of global civil society.
In this section my goal is primarily-to clarify some of the challenges
of coherence posed by such a grand set of goals, and secondarily to
offer a few observations about what is being done to meet them.
198 E.g., Finger, supra note 71, at 65.
199 Jack N. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject
and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L. J. 5, 5-75 (1993).
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Integration
As noted above, the core goal of integration involves incor-
porating environmental, social, and economic goals in the same set of
standards. This general approach is supported by the increasingly
commonplace view, promoted for about two decades now, that one
cannot have a healthy environment without a healthy economy and
society, and vice versa. Of course, these concerns have largely been
kept separate in traditional legal and regulatory systems. The FSC
forest certification program thus attempts to break new ground.
Initially, it seeks to do so by addressing the various concerns in
individual principles. In practice, however, the principles must be
accommodated with each other not only in regional standard setting
processes, but also, and probably more importantly, in the course of
each certification decision. How much responsibility for protecting the
environment, for example, can firms be required to carry when they
are also enjoined to remain economically viable in a market where not
all firms are certified? Similarly, what provisions are sufficient to
protect indigenous rights, given that clear adjudications could take a
long time in many places, and possibly negate the economic viability
of certain enterprises?
These questions have been handled largely in individual
certification processes to date, occasionally with considerable public
conflict, but mostly below the radar screen. The ideal of the FSC (and
derivatively of the PEFC), however, has been that regionally-based
stakeholder standard-setting processes will provide contextually
appropriate answers, reflecting regional culture and values. Making
the tradeoffs in this way implies a culturally based coherence
supported by the reasoning developed in decision process.
This is fairly similar to traditional democratic justifications for
law as well as to Habermas' dialogic model,00 but it faces several
problems. First, of course, it is possible that the tradeoffs would have
200 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE (1989).
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been quite different if different people had participated in the standard
setting process, as has been asserted for example in the FSC Canadian
Maritime standard setting case. There the timber industry claimed that
the standards were inappropriate because they were developed without
sufficient industry input, and was partially sustained by an investi-
gating commission."' While this can be described as a problem of
stakeholder theory, it also affects the ideal of coherence, since it may
be that regional values simply do not and are not likely to fit together
in many situations. Legal theorist Joseph Raz suggests that this is a
problem with all efforts to privilege conceptual coherence in law.20 2
This problem becomes much more serious when the global
scope of the system is considered. The promise of forest certification
is that a piece of certified wood from Malaysia is the environmental
and social equivalent of a piece of certified wood from Sweden. For
this to be the case one of two conditions must be met. Either
"equivalent" must mean merely that a regional standard has been set
in each case and that each piece of wood meets the applicable regional
standard (avoiding for the moment the problem of setting a standard
for what constitutes a legitimate standard setting process). Or, there
must be some logical relationship between the standards making them
comparable within a larger framework. Most forest certification
programs are strongly committed to the second principle, although
they vacillate on how to meet it. The environmental NGO Fern, for
example, argues that one reason performance based systems are
necessary for certification is that only they can achieve coherence.
Environmental management system standards, by contrast are funda-
mentally incapable of achieving coherence.20 3
The commitment of forest certification programs to coherence
reflects an underlying assumption that there is globally common
201 GEMMA BOETEKEES ET AL., FSC COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY, FOREST
STEWARDSHIP STANDARDS FOR THE MARITIME FOREST REGION: FINAL REPORT
(2000) (on file with author).
202 Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REv. 273,310 (1992).
203 FERN, BEHIND THE LOGO: AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL ASSESSMENT
OF FOREST CERTIFICATION SCHEMES at 17 (2001) (on file with author).
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standard for proper forest management, and that it is possible for
forest certification programs to certify it. The assumption of a
common moral standard seems to apply equally to the global civil
society movement. Thus forest certification in particular and global
civil society in general are faced with the need to create coherence in
order to advance their causes. I will not predict whether or how they
will do it-only that they will and must try. One route is for
certification programs to promote master metaphors, such as "eco-
system health" and "sustainable forestry""0 4 and position themselves
to be the ones who progressively fill those metaphors with concrete
meaning. It will be interesting to compare the process with develop-
ments in international commercial arbitration" 5 and computer
operating systems,20 6 where competitive informal definitional
processes seem to have been key, with forest certification, which
seems to lean toward more formal arrangements.
It will also be interesting to observe to what extent variations
in specific standards can be reconciled with the requirement of
coherence. Can the FSC, for example, effectively persuade people that
requiring elaborate protective equipment for adult workers in Swedish
certified forests is equivalent to allowing barefoot twelve-year-olds to
work in third world certified forests, where if they do not do so their
families they may starve? How will this be done? The current debate
within the forest certification world will eventually have to find a
social reception outside it. In doing so it may have to develop a
persuasive account of how facially different regional standards should
be seen as effectively consistent.
204 E.g., Margaret A. Shannon et al., Science Advocacy is Inevitable: Deal
With It, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS ANNUAL
CONFERENCE (1996).
205 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 124.
206 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
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Federalism
The FSC is organized to address the problem of regional
challenges to coherence primarily with a system of closely
coordinated federalism. The primary processes involved are central
review of regionally developed standards for conformance with the
international principles and criteria, and inter-regional "harmoniza-
tion" processes. A number of examples of each are now complete, and
will undoubtedly be subjected to intensive review. From the
perspective of legal scholarship, the harmonization processes are
fascinating. While there are some guidelines for how they are to be
carried out, they seem to vary greatly from one region to the next. This
is not to say that they will not work well, only that a theory of why
they work well will have to be developed after the fact.2"7
Moreover, if one compares these harmonization processes to
traditional Westphalian ones, they could come out looking fairly good.
It is quite possible that NGOs and certification programs link levels
and regions much more successfully than governments. They also
benefit from a narrower set of concerns. The Maritime region's view
of the Great Lakes region's herbicide policy, for example, is not
dependent on the Great Lakes region's position on software sales to
the Maritime region. Global Civil Society programs also benefit from
rapid communications technologies, less cumbersome decision
procedures, and (perhaps) less turf wars. Moreover, it is not inherently
obvious that they are less "democratic" than Westphalian decision
systems, 2°8 given the all of the well known shortcomings of govern-
mental decision making. All in all, then, if coherence can be achieved,
207 To date, the PEFC has devoted considerably less resources than the FSC
to the problem of inter-regional harmonization, and indeed seems to start from the
assumption that all European standards are fundamentally comparable. As Eckhard
Rehbinder, Forest Certification and Environmental Law [cite from TOA] points
out, the FSC is not free of the problem, in that many of the regional standard setting
bodies are organized according to national boundaries, thus suggesting a potential
"renationalization" of standards. Nor is his critique vitiated by the fact that the
larger nations include multiple regional standard setting bodies.
208 Finger, supra note 71, at 58.
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there is some reason to think that civil society organizations are in a
plausible position to do so.
The main shortcomings of global civil society regulatory
programs are their incapacity to raise taxes and conduct wars- not
minor defects, but perhaps not as important as they once were.
Though poorly funded and under staffed, these small programs made
up of relatively well informed participants who communicate
regularly may have better prospects of achieving closure in the
harmonization process than non-expert legislatures with much broader
issue portfolios. Finally, it is worth noting that the nitty-gritty details
in the harmonization and central review processes are being worked
out for the most part by foresters and environmentalists, rather than
lawyers. While they are not trained for the job, neither are most
lawyers, and it will interesting in any case to learn from their
experience.
(In)Determinacy
Indeterminacy refers to a condition in which rules, often quite
elaborate ones, do not generate determinate outcomes in particular
cases. Thus, one can take a given factual situation, apply the rules to
it, and reach more than one logically justified conclusion. In the
certification situation, this would mean that the same forest enterprise
could be seen as either certifiable or not certifiable depending on how
the rules are applied. Some, but not all, legal scholars see indeter-
minacy as a flaw in coherence and an inherent limitation of all rule-
based systems. One common maxim is that the more factors a legal
agent is allowed or required to consider, the less determinate her
decision will be. In practice the situation is probably more compli-
cated, depending on the nature and magnitude of the factors at issue.
But it is worth bearing in mind in the certification context.
I mention the issue for two reasons. First, anecdotal experience
suggests that despite the elaborate systems of rules that have been
developed in many regions (perhaps particularly in the U.S.), certifiers
still seem to feel they must exercise a great deal of "professional
judgment" going beyond the rules in making individual certification
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determinations. Second, these conditions seem to apply even in much
more rule intensive (or "juridified") arenas such as administrative
regulation. Hence, the tendency of certification programs to promul-
gate growing numbers of rules, criteria, and indicators is not likely to
resolve the problem of indeterminacy. Accordingly, the programs
should probably consider whether they would be better off simply
publicizing and attempting to explain the role of professional
judgment in their operations.
Legitimacy
No legal system can endure for long, or be broadly effective,
relying solely on coercion. Rather, it must enjoy voluntary compliance
by the great majority of persons subject to it. In attempting to
understand why and when legal systems are successful, much socio-
legal research has focused on how they build voluntary compliance.
Given that certification systems have very little coercive capacity, this
research is particularly relevant to them. Perhaps the most widely
relied upon concept in explaining legal compliance has been that of
legitimacy. Max Weber argued that a legal system has legitimacy
when it can, without using coercion, elicit compliance with its rules
or decisions even from people who disagree with the substance of
those rules or decisions.209 This is the "pull toward compliance"
referred to above.2"0 The degree of legitimacy enjoyed by forest
certification today is unclear, and in fact is deeply contested.2 1 Some
209 WEBER, supra note 104, at 3 1.
210 Whether and when legal systems actually function in this way is a difficult
question about which I make no assumptions here. As Alan Hyde has pointed out,
it may be a mistake to assume that legal systems generally enjoy legitimacy. Alan
Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV.
379, 379-426 (1983). It is quite possible that behavior described as being based on
legitimacy is actually based on self-interest or other functional considerations. On
the other hand, as Franck's scholarship makes clear, it is difficult to understand
many developments in international law without the concept of legitimacy.
FRANCK, supra note 13 1.
211 Cashore, supra note 67.
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observers, echoing my long-ago conversation with Professors Lyons
and Mohawk, think it inevitable and only a matter of time until the
obvious rightness of certification wins the day. Others view
certification as a fundamentally coercive phenomenon. One industry
representative told me bluntly that "proper forest management is what
the FSC says it is... nothing more, nothing less." His point was that
the reason his company would maintain FSC certification was simple
economic self-preservation. It could not afford to get a bad name in its
markets, and the FSC and its allies were capable of giving it a bad
name. Other company representatives have of course said the
opposite, and talked about the basic correctness of the FSC or other
certification standards.
For now, it appears that the legitimacy of forest certification
programs is largely derivative and depends largely on the credibility
of the groups affiliated with them. Thus the FSC program relies
primarily on the public legitimacy of environmental (and to a lesser
extent labor and human rights) NGOs, while other programs rely more
on the somewhat uncertain legitimacy of the forestry profession,
industry, and state agencies. Over time, however, the dynamics of
legitimacy are likely to become more general, and certification
systems will have to develop their own legitimacy. Whether that is
happening and how is currently an open question subject to ongoing
research.2t2 By their nature, however, certification systems face two
especially intriguing problems of legitimacy, with which I close this
paper.
The first problem has to do with certification programs'
reliance on market relationships and consumer preferences to organize
governance institutions. This strategy may give up one of the
traditional legitimacy advantages enjoyed by civil society organiza-
tions, which Ann Phillips describes as having a much greater capacity
to "capture people's hearts and minds"2"3 than do governments.
Assuming that her assessment is accurate, it is worth pondering the
212 Id.
213 Anne Phillips, Who Needs Civil Society? 46(1) DISSENT 56, 58 (1999).
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implications of the use of marketing techniques to organize civil
society relationships. Might this strategy inherently reduce the depth
and durability of commitment to civil society norms? Might it re-
frame the background in which civil society actors are seen so that
their views have the same ontological status as all other individual
consumer tastes? If so, the use of market methods could create
considerably greater difficulties than are currently apparent for
legitimizing certification institutions over the middle and long term.
The second legitimacy challenge has to do with the global
reach of forest certification programs. To date, the primary focus of
certification systems has been on retailers and consumers in wealthy
countries. In a global civil society, however, they will have to
legitimate themselves simultaneously with poor, third world woods
workers and villagers as well as with relatively well off northern
workers. This is a challenge that no governmental or intergovern-
mental body has come close to meeting. If certification programs in
fact achieve anything approximating north-south, inter-class, inter-
cultural legitimacy, they will have pulled off an organizational feat
unprecedented in human law and governance. Ultimately, however,
even if they are successful in establishing global legitimacy, we will
not know for some time whether they thereby function to challenge
and supplant governmental legal systems, or in fact to extend and
amplify them.
